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ABSTRACT
The pressures for reform within the World Trade Organization have led to the European Union
(EU) reforming its sugar policy with a price cut phased from 2006 and scheduled to end in 2009.
The reform will have an impact on the sugar protocol African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries that have a preferential market access to the European Union with a protected price.
This study investigates the effect of EU sugar policy reform has on these ACP sugar countries.
First, it examines how the protocol countries’ sugar supply and demand determinants.
While the determinants of supply in some countries performed as expected, others did not show
sign of an improvement due to the sugar protocol. On the demand side we found that in some
countries price does not affect the decision of the consumer.
Second it explores the protocol countries transfer benefits before and after the reform.
Before the reform, the countries were enjoying substantial transfer benefits. After the reform,
there are some countries that will no longer be able to make profits by selling to the European
Union.
Finally, we develop a quota market analysis to examine negotiated transfer quota
outcomes between ACP countries. We allow for the countries that can no longer make a profit to
sell their quota rights to the countries that can still make a profit. We assumed equal bargaining
powers and unequal bargaining powers. In the equal bargaining power case, total profit is equally
divided between seller and buyer. In the unequal bargaining power case, we consider two
scenarios. The first scenario where the world sugar price is not affected by EU sugar policy
reform revealed that the sellers would have greater bargaining power and a larger share of the
profit. The second scenario where the world sugar price is increased by thirty percent revealed
that the buyer would exercise superior bargaining power relative to the seller and would have a
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larger share of the profit. Buyers can expand their production and sellers can use the revenues to
diversify away from sugar.

viii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Background
The world sugar market is one of the most heavily protected markets with most producers
benefiting from a variety of programs, such as production quotas, supply controls, market
sharing, sales quotas, import quotas, imports tariffs, exports subsidies. The European Union is
both one of the world’s largest exporters and importers of sugar; but it is also one of the world’s
most heavily protected markets. The EU sugar industry has existed for many years as has the
tradition of protection for that industry. Despite changes that have occurred in many EU
agricultural sectors due to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms, the sugar sector has
hardly been touched since its inception in 1968.
Although the European Union remains one of the world’s leading sugar producers, it is
also a major importer of sugar. Nearly all EU sugar imports occur under special preferential
arrangements (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald). This includes the African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) sugar group which supplies the largest volume of sugar to the European Union. There are
19 former European colonies (Barbados, Belize, Congo, Fiji, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Swaziland, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) that produce sugar and receive
preferential access to EU markets. Under the sugar protocol these countries are able to export
approximately 1.3 MMT of sugar per year to the European Union at a guaranteed minimum price
that is substantially above the world sugar price. This acts to transfer resources from the
European Union to ACP countries. The European Union essentially applies its internal sugar
policy, consisting of production quotas and guaranteed prices, to the African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) sugar group (Herrmann and Weiss 1995).
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After being criticized for many years, EU sugar policy faced a ruling in 2004, handed
down by the World Trade Organization (WTO), claiming that the European Union’s support
policy allows European countries to illegally export sugar. The ruling was the result of an
investigation motivated by complaints from Brazil, Thailand and Australia, three major sugar
producers, who claimed that EU sugar policy was highly trade distorting and would have to be
reevaluated if freer trade were to be achieved. In order to comply with the requirement of the
WTO panel and to make the EU sugar sector more compatible with the rest of the world, the EU
Council reformed its’ sugar sector in 2005. This reform involved a progressive reduction in
export subsidies and a large cut in the intervention price starting in 2006. The implications of an
EU sugar regime adjustment have been projected to be a reduction in the quantity of sugar
exported and a fall in the European domestic price of sugar by 36% over a four-year period (20%
cut in 2006, 25% in 2007, 30% in 2008 and a 36% cut in 2009).
Reforming EU sugar policy will mean that ACP suppliers will receive the same price cut
on exports to the European Union as do EU sugar growers. It is projected, as a result, that ACP
suppliers will experience revenue losses.
1.2 ACP Sugar Protocol
The European Union occupies an important place in the world sugar market as both a major
exporter (in 2002 the EU was the third largest sugar manufacturer after Brazil and India) and
importer. Although tariffs on many agricultural imports are high, the European Union grants
preferences to developing countries under a variety of schemes. Currently all EU sugar imports
come under special preferential arrangements. These preferential trade arrangements, which are
primarily for developing countries, are a key feature of the EU import regime and represent a
crucial aspect of the economies of the beneficiaries (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald). Furthermore,
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there exist historic ties between certain EU Member States and their former colonies. Since 1975,
these arrangements have been incorporated into the Sugar Protocol, agreed between certain
developing countries and the EU alongside the wider EU-ACP Partnership Agreement.
The EU sugar regime allows for duty free or for reduced duty imports of both raw and
white sugar from these countries (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald). The EU-ACP cooperation can
be traced back to the Treaty of Rome that was signed in 1957 and guaranteed to contribute to the
growth of the countries with historical connections with EU member states. As part of the UK’s
accession arrangements, a preferential sugar import program was agreed to with the traditional
developing country suppliers. The ACP protocol effectively translated a United Kingdom
commitment to the commonwealth into an EU (at the time EEC) commitment to the ACP. The
preferential access was reduced from about 2 million tons imported by the UK refineries under
the old agreement to 1.3 million tons of raw sugar (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald). The sugar
protocol was embodied in the Lomé Convention of 1975. The sugar protocol and a parallel
agreement with India allow for the import of 1.3 million tons of raw sugar, white value a year.
This tonnage is not subject to import duties and is purchased at the level of the EU support price
for raw sugar. In 2000 the Cotonou agreement replaced the Lomé Convention, but sugar
arrangements remained practically unchanged (Sergey, Lindsay and Donald).
1.3 Problem Statement
The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union have
mutually benefited from a long and profitable partnership in the sugar sector under the terms of
the ACP/EU Sugar Protocol. This agreement, which came into force in 1975, guarantees access
to the EU market for fixed quantities of ACP sugar at preferential prices over an indefinite period
of time. It is a legally binding, intergovernmental agreement between ACP signatory States and
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the European Union with obligations to be met by all contracting parties. The Sugar Protocol is
acknowledged by the recipients as a model for cooperation development because, according to
involved parties, it has brought significant benefits to the economies of small and vulnerable
countries (African Caribbean and Pacific Sugar Group).
Given the WTO ruling and the European Union’s intent to reduce both domestic
production and exports in order to fulfill its commitments, the guaranteed price that the ACP
sugar group will receive will be reduced by 36% as of 2009. In addition to the direct impact on
EU sugar farmers and producers, the reform will affect all countries presently benefiting from
preferential access, such as the sugar protocol countries. Though the total sugar protocol quota
will remain constant at 1.3 million tons, the price cut applies to their exports to the European
Union too and will be reflected in reduced export revenues.
Many ACP countries do not have a resilient socio-economic infrastructure capable of
absorbing the consequences resulting from such price reductions as do EU member states. The
reliance upon sugar in these countries is markedly different from that of producers within the
European Union. ACP sugar industries typically comprise a large percentage of Gross Domestic
Product while both the employment and social benefits provided by the industries are central to
the social cohesion of ACP communities. The dominance of the sugar industry has meant that it
is the focal point around which many social services and infrastructure developments have
evolved. The most serious impact of the reform may be the loss of health and educational
services funded in part by the sugar industry. In summary, there is a serious risk of economic
devastation and irreparable damage to the ACP and other less developed sugar countries if the
European Union reforms of the sugar sector are implemented. it is important to identify a
response to the reform that will limit losses. This analysis looks at how best to ensure the future
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well being of ACP sugar suppliers in the new environment arising from EU sugar policy reform.
1.4 Justification
The lack of extensive country specific research on the impact of EU sugar policy reform on ACP
has served to stimulate this study. It is important to know the outcome effect on these countries
and recommend a judicious solution to deal with the situation, since all are less developed
economies. Because the sugar industry is a vital source of jobs and government revenue in most
ACP countries, it is important to identify strategies that will further protect the development of
their economies and families. The success of these industries is influenced by the trade
agreements between the European Union and the ACP countries that have been ongoing since
1975. With EU sugar policy reform, ACP economies will be affected, thus the need to formulate
optimal strategies that are not only be consistent with the ruling of the WTO but will also
preserve the best interest of the ACP economies is of paramount interest.
This study investigates the effect of the EU sugar policy reform on the ACP sugar group.
This is of special relevance, since ACP countries and the European Union have a special trade
preference in the form of the sugar protocol. On the other hand, a reform of EU sugar policy will
reduce the ACP preferential price and hence, affect revenue transfers that ACP countries were
getting. The work is meaningful in that it will identify a possible response to the EU sugar policy
reform for ACP countries. Moreover, it will identify the strategy that optimally distributes the
benefits of the ACP countries through the utilization of their profit functions.
Despite the fact that the impact of EU sugar policy reform has been a principal concern as
of late, not all relevant aspects of the topic have been considered. For instance, the redistribution
of quota rights amongst ACP countries has not been studied in detail. Many of the studies have
focused on the assessment of revenue losses and identifying potential winners and losers from
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the new policy. This paper contributes to the limited literature by extending the work on the
implications to explore the effect of a market for the sugar import quota among the ACP
countries. A quota market in the ACP sugar producing group would have the advantage of
restructuring the quota distribution from being relatively arbitrary to a greater concentration in
low cost ACP countries. This would lead to sugar preferences being redirected to more
competitive countries. Moreover, high cost producing countries can use the revenues from quota
sales to invest in research and production of other enterprises which can lead to those countries
becoming more competitive in other activities.
1.5 Objectives
The main objective of this study is to investigate the impact of EU sugar policy reform on
revenue transfers to ACP sugar producing countries and to suggest a mechanism for dealing with
the situation. The specific objectives are as follows:
1.) To estimate the determinants of the sugar industries in all ACP countries. The structure of
each country’s model includes behavioral equations for area harvested, yield, and production for
sugar cane on the supply side, and per capita consumption and ending stocks on the demand side.
2.) To determine and measure production and transportation costs of sugar for each ACP
country. This will be used to evaluate the transfer of profits before the reform and the projected
revenue transfer after the entire price cut comes into effect. We will then explore how protocol
countries are going to be affected by the reform and determine which countries will likely
discontinue their sugar exports to the EU.
3.) To construct a quota market model based on bilateral monopoly theory where countries
whose sugar industry cannot survive the EU sugar policy reform sell their quota rights to
countries that are more efficient. We apply the model to determine quota allocation, bargaining
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powers and the price each country will pay. Using the outcome of the bilateral monopoly model,
we will then calculate the profit yielded by each country and contrast it with the reform case in
order to show the improvement that the mechanism is going to generate.
1.6 Literature Review
A rich body of literature regarding the ACP-EU sugar protocol has emerged in recent
years. All of the studies recognize that the sugar protocol has provided some economic benefits
to the ACP countries. Herrmann and Weiss (1995) provided an economic evaluation of the sugar
protocol by elaborating on the impacts on prices, trade, export earnings and economic welfare.
Using the Newbery and Stiglitz approach, Hermann and Weiss jointly evaluate the sugar
protocol’s impact on the level and instability of sugar export earnings and computed transfer and
risk benefits. Their major conclusion is that the policy has to be evaluated differently from the
donor’s and the recipient’s respective points of view. Focusing on the recipient country’s point
of view, they found that there is a revenue raising or stabilizing effect created by the sugar
protocol. In addition they pointed out that the instability of sugar export earnings was lowered in
all but one ACP country. Their third finding was that, in addition to the transfer benefits that
ACP countries were receiving, there was a significant portion of the welfare gains that were
realized could be attributed to risk benefits.
McDonald (1996) extended the work on the EU sugar policy to explore the implications
of a reform for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. He showed that there are significant
reductions in income transfers and that the Caribbean countries plus Fiji and Mauritius bear the
heaviest loss. In a similar manner, Milner, Morgan and Zgovu (2004) explored the way in which
a reform will affect the transfers of welfare to the ACP countries. The authors take into account
the fact that OECD sugar reform can affect both domestic and world prices. They concluded that
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while some countries would lose due to decreased transfers, others may gain due to the impact
that sugar reform has on world prices. They argue that the differences are due to the uneven
allocation of preferential quotas across protocol countries and the highly differential dependence
of the countries on EU and non-EU export markets.
The practice of quota leasing has been studied for various commodities. Bureau,
Guyomard, Morin and Requillard (1997) develop an analytical framework for evaluating the
consequences of a market for quota rights in the EU sugar sector. The theoretical framework they
use is based on duality theory and employs the concept of the virtual or shadow price of a
rationed good. They show that the equilibrium of the market for a quota is a function of the level
of the world price of sugar and that different cases have to be distinguished when analyzing the
comparative statics of such a market. They use a simulation to show that marketable quota rights
would benefit farmers. Butcher and Heady studied probable quota exchange within a small Iowa
area and found that there are some possibilities for income gains (cost savings) by redistributing
quotas. They argue that permitting quotas to be traded in a “quota market” would appear to be an
expeditious way for allocating quotas so that the efficiency of production will be greater than
with ordinary mandatory controls. Babcock and Foster (1992) explain the distribution of
economic rents between owners of quota rights and renters under mandatory supply controls and
examine how this distribution changes with increases in marginal costs.
There are several variants of the bilateral monopoly model based on a variety of
assumptions regarding both institutional setting and bargaining procedure (Truett and Truett). An
extensive discussion of bilateral monopoly can be found in the works of. Bowley (1928), Fellner
(1947), and Machlup and Taber (1960). These authors describe a solution based on joint profit
maximization that would lead to a determinate quantity traded of the intermediate product but
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not a determinate intermediate product price. Recently, Blair, Kaserman, and Romano (1989)
have reiterated the joint profit maximizing solution. Like earlier writers, they argue that the
quantity traded of the intermediate good will be determinate, while its price will be
indeterminate. Truett and Truett (1993) use a contract curve approach to establish that the
equilibrium price of the intermediate product is determined through a bargaining process
between the seller and the buyer and that the optimal solution calls for a joint profit
maximization by both the seller and the buyer. Devadoss and Cooper (2000) use an optimal
control, dynamic optimization model to simultaneously determine the price and quantity of the
intermediate product in a joint profit maximizing bilateral monopoly with equal bargaining
power. Dasgupta and Devadoss (2002) also applied a game theoretic model to derive the
equilibrium price and quantity of the intermediate product when buyer and seller have unequal
bargaining power. Their game theoretic model specifies multi-period contracts with threats and
punishments that induce Nash equilibrium for a jointly negotiated price and quantity.
1.7 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation will be organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 has presented the
background, research problem statement, justification of the research, objectives of the study and
a review of the literature. Chapter 2 will examine the ACP sugar economies. The theoretical
framework for the econometric estimation, the transfer benefits determination, and the bilateral
monopoly approach will be discussed in Chapter 3. The empirical approach will be conducted to
determine bargaining power, prices and quantities traded between the countries, and the results
will be discussed in Chapter 4. The summary, conclusions, and suggestions for further research
will be included in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2. STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ACP COUNTRIES’ SUGAR
ECONOMIES
2.1. EU Sugar Policy
The European Union’s sugar policy uses production quotas, import controls, and export refunds
(subsidies) to support producer prices at levels which are well above international prices. The
program is financed primarily by EU consumers who pay higher prices than world market prices.
The sugar policy began in 1965, as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which dates
to 1958. Two institutional support prices, “the intervention price” (a floor price) and the
“threshold price” (a minimum import price) form a band within which the domestic EU market
price moves. The threshold price is meant to ensure that domestic market prices can rise toward a
target price without being undercut by third-country imports. If prices fall below this intervention
price, then the European Union buys the commodity and stores it until the Commission decides
to sell it domestically or export it. These prices vary by country to allow for transportation costs
between surplus and deficit areas. Intervention sugar prices have been constant in nominal terms
since 1984/85 and have been more than double world market prices during most of the past 20
years. Some countries (e.g., Italy, Portugal, and Spain) have also been allowed to pay national
aid to sugar producers which has, in turn, encouraged further production (F.O. Licht, p.518).
Import duties are used to prevent lower priced imports from the world market, and export
refunds are paid to exporters so as to cover the gap between the EU price and the generally lower
world market prices when commodities are sold from intervention stocks. The basic market
support system for sugar remains virtually unchanged in the current day as it was initially
designed in 1968, despite reforms to the CAP.
2.2. EU Sugar Consumption, Production and Trade
Sugar production, consumption, and trade in the European Union have been highly influenced by
10

government programs through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Sugar is produced from
either sugar cane (2 percent) or beets (98 percent) in almost all of the EU’s 25 member states,
(with the exception of Luxembourg, Estonia, Cyprus, and Malta). Major sugar producing states
are France and Germany, with about 50 percent of total production, followed by Poland, Italy,
and the United Kingdom (European Commission, 2004 (b)). Both production and domestic use
have significantly increased over time (ERS-USDA, PS&D Tables). Total sugar production and
consumption in 1961 was 5,474,000 and 6,312,000 MT, respectively; in 2004, production and
consumption totaled 14,358,000 and 17,132,000 MT, respectively. Despite this significant
change from 1960 levels, production has remained relatively stable since 1992 and domestic
consumption has been nearly constant since the beginning of the 1990s (Figure 2.1). From 1961
to 1981, total exports of refined sugar increased (Figure 2.2). From 1961 to 2004, total exports
grew from 1,040,000 to 7,130,000 MT. Exports have exceeded imports since 1977. Imports
increased substantially from 1961 to 1974; since 1978, they have been relatively stable and
significantly below the volume of sugar exports (Figure 2.2). Total imports, mostly in raw sugar,
were 1,900,000 MT in 2004. In general, the EU is a net exporter; however, because of the
difference between the high price paid for imports relative to the low price received for exports,
a negative trade balance in terms of value has existed since 2002 (European Commission, 2004
(b)).
2.3. Source of Reform
The European Union was pressured by external sources to reform its sugar regime. These
pressures were associated with how other trading countries on the world sugar market are
affected by the trade distorting effects of EU sugar policy. The major external agent for reform
of sugar policies lies in multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the auspices of the WTO.
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Figure2.1.: EU sugar total production and total consumption 1960-2006
Source: USDA PS&D data
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Figure 2.2.: EU total sugar imports and exports 1960-2006
Source: USDA PS&D data
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In September 2002, Australia and Brazil filed complaints and requests for consultations with the
European Union through the World Trade Organization, concerning the nature of the EU’s sugar
market. The complaint was that the volume of EU subsidized exports of sugar exceeded the
levels the European Union had committed itself to under the World Trade Organization and that
this was causing harm by reducing world prices. In 2004, the World Trade Organization, after an
investigation, acknowledged the claims made by the three countries and urged the European
Union to reform its sugar policy. As expected, therefore, that same year the European
Commission considered plans for a radical reform of the sugar regime. It proposed to cut back
sugar exports and export refunds substantially, reduce intervention, reduce EU production and
the internal sugar price, and grant de-coupled payments to sugar beet farmers. These reforms
were to be phased in from 2006 over a period of four years.
The reform is expected to enhance the competitiveness and market-orientation of the EU
sugar sector, guarantee it a viable long-term future and strengthen the EU’s negotiating position
in the current round of world trade talks. In addition, it will bring a system, which has remained
largely unchanged for almost 40 years, into line with the rest of the reformed Common
Agricultural Policy. The guaranteed price for white sugar will be cut by 36 percent over four
years. Other details of the reform are that farmers will be compensated for, on average, 64.2
percent of the price cut through a decoupled payment; countries which give up more than half of
their production quota will be entitled to pay an additional coupled payment of 30 percent of the
income loss for a temporary period of five years; a generous voluntary restructuring scheme will
be established to provide incentives for less competitive producers to leave the sector; and
intervention buying of surplus production will be phased out after four years (EUROPA press
release, February 2006).
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Within these proposals, the commission takes it as granted that the provisions of the ACP
sugar protocol continue to commit the European Union to buying the annually agreed quantity of
sugar from protocol countries. However, the commission also recognizes that the proposed
reforms mean that the commitment would have to be fulfilled at a lower guaranteed price (i.e.,
the new lower EU intervention price.)
2.4. ACP Sugar Protocol Quota Allocation
Currently, 18 ACP countries plus India participate in the sugar protocol. The core of the
agreement is the European Union’s obligation to import specific quantities of sugar from these
countries’ at guaranteed prices derived from the internal EU price and are supposed to equal the
price range obtained in the European Union. The protocol also obliges ACP countries to deliver
the agreed quantity; failure to deliver for reasons other than “force majeure” leads to a quota loss
of the same amount. Sugar represents a high proportion of total agricultural products and is the
primary agricultural export of these ACP countries. The European Union is a major outlet for
ACP sugar. Quota allocations have remained nearly constant since 1975 for most countries
except for Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast which joined the protocol in early 1980.
Table 2.1 and the Charts below present the distribution of the quota and their share of
production and export quantities before the price cut came into effect. The sugar protocol is a
way by which the European Union provides transfer assistance to its old colonies.
Sugar protocol countries are a rather heterogeneous group with diverging production
levels and different degrees of dependency on the EU market. Figure 2.3 shows that there are
five countries that receive the majority of the quota. Mauritius receives by far the largest delivery
rights with nearly forty per cent of total quota, followed by Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica and Swaziland.
Together, these five countries capture almost eighty per cent of the total quota, whereas
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Table 2.1. : ACP Sugar Protocol quota distribution
Countries

Quota

Production 05

Exports 05

Share of total quota

Share of 05 production

Share of 04 exports

Barbados
Belize

50312.00

40000

125.8

140.3

105000

3.0

38.4

42.5

Congo

10186.00

75000

0.8

13.6

19.7

Ivory Coast

10186.00

140000

0.8

7.3

35.2

Fiji

165348.00

330000

12.4

50.1

54.6

Guyana

159410.00

270000

12.0

59.0

76.3

Jamaica

118696.00

184000

8.9

64.5

99.8

Kenya

10000.00

489000

0.8

2.0

46.0

Madagascar

10760.00

26000

0.8

41.4

121.6

Malawi

20824.00

260000

Mauritius

491031.00

600000

35872
95007
51624
28924
303039
209043
118905
21760
8852
104166
539457

3.8

40349.00

St. Kitts

15591.00

15000

Swaziland

117845.00

598000

Tanzania

10186.00

255000

Trinidad

43751.00

35000

Zambia

250000

Zimbabwe

26987
30225

Total

1331687.00

525000

1.6

8.0

20.0

36.9

81.8

91.0

11478

1.2

103.9

135.8

538887
20149
35201
153487
149458

8.8

19.7

21.9

0.8

4.0

50.6

3.3

125.0

124.3

2.0

10.8

17.6

2.3

5.8

20.2

Source: ACP Sugar Website, FAS PS&D data and own computation
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Figure 2.3.: ACP sugar quota share of total quota 2005
Source: ACP Sugar Web Site
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the remaining ten ACP countries receive less than five per cent of the quota.
Figure 2.4 shows that countries such as Barbados, Trinidad, and St. Kitts, saw their 2005
production fall short of the quota that they were allocated (their sugar quota amount was more
than 2005’s total production ). Other countries for which their quota accounts for a major
proportion of their sugar production are Mauritius (81.9%), Jamaica (64.5%), Guyana (59%), Fiji
(50.1%), Madagascar (41.4%), and Belize (38.4%). These proportions suggest that these
countries will have a high dependency on the sugar protocol. The other countries will be less
dependent on the sugar protocol.
Information on the quota share of 2005 exports for each country is also provided in
Figure 2.5 above. Linking the two figures, the dependency of the countries on the Sugar Protocol
can be seen. Countries like Mauritius and Jamaica, for example, export almost all their sugar to
the European Union, since EU prices are above world market prices and their quotas are
relatively high. Other sugar protocol countries, such as Swaziland, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, which
are important sugar producers as well, have much lower quotas and thus a lower dependency on
EU markets. Nevertheless, the sugar protocol offers most ACP countries an interesting marketing
alternative with favorable conditions that plays a substantial role in their economies. Some ACP
countries such as Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania produce more than their quota but their
exports show that they did not fulfill their quota quantity for that year. There is an uneven
allocation of the preferential quotas across protocol countries. That is reflected in the fact that the
distribution is not proportional to the production capacity of each country. However it can be
seen that, for the most part, the quota accounts for a significant share of the exports for these
countries. This supports the statement that the sugar protocol is a large source of revenue for
these countries.
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Figure 2.4.: ACP sugar quota share of 2005 production
Source: ACP Sugar Web Site and USDA/FAS PS&D Data
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Figure 2.5.: ACP sugar quota share of 2005 sugar exports
Source: ACP Sugar Web Site and USDA/FAS PS&D Data
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2.5. ACP Sugar Industry Cost Structure
Cost estimates are important in understanding the dynamics of sugar markets and for assessing
the competitiveness of sugar producing countries. In our analysis, we use these estimates as
benchmarks to gain insight into the vulnerability and resilience of the sugar producing countries
at alternative price levels. In analyzing cost, we considered both transportation and production
cost. It was difficult to construct a complete data set on transportation and production cost for the
ACP countries. Estimation was not possible because a time series data set of the variables that
needed to be used was not available. As a result, we had to settle for data based on these
computations. Two sources were used in computing the cost data set. For production costs, we
used the USDA attaché reports and for transportation costs we used a data set that LMC
International was willing to share. LMC International is a British consultancy that is
internationally recognized for its expertise on sugar. It works on cost of production issues and
regularly updates variable costs for a wide variety of producers worldwide; however most of the
figures are not published. What we did was to use the available data and the determinants of each
variable to use as proxies for specific countries for which we could not obtain the data.
2.5.1. Transportation Costs
2.5.1.1. Freight Rates
Freight is represented by the average cost of sea freight to EU ports in the first half of 2007. Out
of the seventeen countries, data was obtained for ten. LMC reports that all southern African
countries ship from either the ports of Maputo or Beira in Mozambique and therefore have the
same or similar rates. Following this rationale, freight rates are derived for the remaining seven
countries based on the assumption that countries from the same region are shipping from the
same port, and hence, all have the same rates. Table 2.4 shows the detailed computation.

21

2.5.1.2. Fobbing Costs
‘Fobbing’ refers to the cost of taking raw sugar from the mill to a free on board (f.o.b) basis (i.e.
loaded on a vessel in the port of origin). Here, again, we were given the fobbing rates for the
same ten countries as with the freight rates. Using those rates in association with the factors that
explain differences in transport costs we were able to derive the fobbing rates for the remaining
seven countries. The first and most studied determinant that we considered is distance (Table
2.2). Many studies have explored the relationship between geographical distance and transport
costs and most conclude that there is a positive link between the two variables. The greater the
distance between two locations, the higher the expected transport cost. The second factor
considered is country characteristics, which relates to geographical and infrastructure measures
(Table 2.3). For geographical measures, we consider whether the country of origin is landlocked
or whether it is an island. In the case of the infrastructure measure, we look at the density of the
road network, the paved road network, and the number of per capita telephone main lines in
order to measure the cost of travel in and through a country. The next factor that we consider is
whether the countries involved share a common border. Following Limão and Venables, we
consider that neighboring countries have more integrated transport networks that should reduce
the number of transshipments (from rail to road or across different types of rail gauge). Also,
neighboring countries are more likely to have transit and customs agreements that reduce transit
times and translate into lower shipping and insurance costs. Finally, the higher volume of trade
between neighbor countries should dramatically increase the possibilities for backhauling
allowing for the sharing of fixed costs over two trips. Details of the fobbing data are presented in
Table 2.4.
2.5.2. Production Costs
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Production costs were derived using the USDA/ERS sugar and sweetener situation outlook
reports and data from the World Bank (International Development Magazine (IDM)). Both
sources used the estimates published by LMC International but did not report detailed results for
specific countries. According to the USDA ERS report, LMC considers three different stages in
the estimation of the sugar cane cost of production. The first comprises field costs. It covers land
preparation before planting to the delivery of cane to the processing mill. Estimates are made for
labor, capital, and all fuel, chemicals, and fertilizers used in the field. The second stage is the
factory costs. For sugarcane, this covers all costs from the initial arrival to the delivery of raw
sugar into bulk storage at the mill. In addition, all byproduct credits are applied against factory
costs. As with field costs, estimates are divided into their respective labor, capital, fuel and
chemical components. The third stage represents administrative and overhead costs that cannot
be adequately included solely as a field or factory expense. The results that the USDA reported
show the average cost of producing raw cane sugar for the groups of countries. In the September
2001 sugar and sweetener situation and outlook (USDA, ERS), it was reported that Zambia and
Zimbabwe are among the lowest cost sugar producers with an average cost of just 7.81 cents per
pound (172.18$/Ton) for the years 1994-1999 . Another report from the same source shows that
Belize and Guyana are in the medium to high cost group with an average of 16.54 cents per
pound (364.64$/Ton). The same report puts Barbados, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad
and Tobago in the high cost group with an average of 23.56 cents per pound (519.41$/Ton).
Using pertinent information obtained from the World Bank, we were able to determine a
grouping of the countries based on their average raw sugar production costs.
Low cost producers: Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Swaziland
Medium to High cost producers: Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, Belize, Congo, and Tanzania
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High cost producers: Ivory Coast, St. Kitts and Nevis, Barbados, Jamaica, Kenya,
Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago.
A detailed computation is shown in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.6 below.
2.5.3. Summary
The production cost of sugar in the ACP countries ranged from 673 $/T to 263 $/T in 2005.
These costs are low to slightly high when compared to many other sugar producing countries in
the world. Countries like Trinidad and Tobago, Madagascar, Kenya, Jamaica, Barbados, St. Kitts
and Nevis, Ivory Coast, were already struggling to produce sugar at a competitive price.
These production costs are very important because they will be used to assess the profitability of
the sugar production in each country. For simplicity, we assume that these values will be the
same when the final price cut is implemented. The break-even, before and after the reform, were
also reported in Table 2.2. Based on these results, we can see that, before the reform, all ACP
countries could profitably export to the European Union. Although some countries are not as
profitable as others (the break-even for Trinidad is 7.1$/T while Zimbabwe is making a profit of
417$/T), it is clear that the sugar protocol played a significant role in the economies of the ACP
countries. After the final price cut, the EU price will be reduced by 36%. The computation of the
resulting break-even prices is summarized in Table 2.2. Estimates show some concerning results
as all ACP countries will suffer a loss. Moreover, out of the seventeen countries, only seven are
able to obtain a positive profit with their transfer expected to decrease substantially. The heaviest
losses will occur in those ACP countries that had a large share of the quota but were high cost
producers (i.e., those that were more dependent on the Sugar Protocol).
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Table 2.2. Geographical distance
Country
Congo
Mozambique
Madagascar
Uganda
Kenya
Trinidad
Guyana
Barbados
St. Kitts an

Capital
Distance (mile)
Brazzaville
1813.31
Maputo
0
Antananarivo
1068.55
Kampala
1731.85
Nairobi
1659.03
Port of Spain
379.96
Georgetown
0
Bridgetown
479.54
Basseterre
831.83

Source LSU AgCenter GIS Lab
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Table 2.3. ACP countries Geographical and infrastructures measures
Country
Geographical Paved (Km)
unpaved (Km)
Barbados
Island
1,600
Belize
Port
575
2,432
Congo
Landlocked
2,794
150,703
Fiji
Island
1,692
1,748
Guyana
Port
590
7,380
Ivory Coast
Port
6,500
73,500
Jamaica
Island
15,937
5,615
Kenya
Port
8,933
54,332
Madagascar
Island
7,617
58,046
Malawi
Landlocked
6,956
8,495
Mauritius
Island
2,028
St. Kitts & Nevis
Island
163
220
Swaziland
Port
1,078
2,516
Tanzania
Port
6,808
72,083
Trinidad & Tobago Island
4,252
4,068
Zambia
Landlocked
20,117
71,323
Zimbabwe
Landlocked
18,481
78,786
Source : CIA Factbook
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Total/ rank (Km)
1600 (177)
3007 (167)
153497 (34)
3440 (164)
7970 (142)
80000 (60)
21552 (109)
63265 (74)
65663 (70)
15451 (123)
2028 (173)
383 (198)
3594 (161)
78891 (61)
8320 (140)
91440 (55)
97267 (46)

Main line/rank
134900 (133)
33900 (176)
9700 (205)
108400 (139)
110100 (138)
730000 (89)
342000 (113)
264800 (119)
133900 (134)
175200 (127)
357300 (106)
25000 (182)
44000 (165)
165013 (128)
323800 (115)
91800 (146)
344,500 (112

Table 2. 4. ACP Production cost and Break even prices before and after reform
Country

Prod Cost Fobbing Freight
$/Ton
$/Ton
$/Ton
520
15
61
Barbados
330
36
61
Belize
345
64
65
Congo
300
8.5
67
Fiji
310
6
61
Guyana
450
10
65
Ivory Cost
550
23
61
Jamaica
500
70
65
Kenya
30
65
Madagascar 575
215
64
65
Malawi
335
17
57
Mauritius
475
20
61
St. K&N
275
30
65
Swaziland
335
30
65
Tanzania
600
12
61
Trinidad
245
92
65
Zambia
154
44
65
Zimbabwe
Source: LMC, World Bank and own computation

Total costs
$/Ton
596
427
474
375
377
525
634
635
670
344
409
556
370
430
673
402
263

EUP 05
$/Ton
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
680.13
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EUP 09
$/Ton
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32

PreR-BE
$/Ton
84.13
252.9
206.1
305.1
303.5
155.1
46.4
45.1
10.1
335.9
270.8
124.1
310.1
250.1
7.1
278.1
417.0

PostR-BE
$/Ton
-160.7
8.1
-38.7
60.3
58.7
-89.7
-198.4
-199.7
-234.7
91.1
26.0
-120.7
65.3
5.3
-237.7
33.3
172.2

800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Cost $/T

Pre-reform EU sugar price $/T

Figure 2.6.: ACP production cost and EU Pre and post-reform prices
Source: LMC, World Bank
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Reform Eu sugar price $/T

CHAPTER 3.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Theoretical Framework
3.1.1. Supply and Demand Specification
Supply and demand are based on consumer and producer behavior and describe market relations
between prospective sellers and buyers of a good. These relationships are the fundamental basis
of microeconomic analysis and are used as the underlying foundation for numerous economic
models and theories. For example, in a competitive market the equilibrium will be reached when
the quantity demanded by consumers is equal to the quantity supplied by producers. The theory
of supply and demand is critical in that it allows economists to understand the market economy
by explaining the mechanism by which resource allocation decisions are made. An important
concept in understanding supply and demand is that of elasticity. The elasticity is a measure of
the relative change in supply or demand in response to a relative change of certain variables.
3.1.1.1. Consumer Theory
Economic theory presents demand as the relationship between the price of goods and services
and the particular quantity demanded at each price which is based on the theory of consumer
choice. The quantity demanded is the quantity of goods or services that a consumer or group of
consumers plan to buy at a certain price and time. There are two main factors that influence the
demand for a good: taste and ability to buy. Taste, which is the relative desirability of various
combinations of goods and services, determines the willingness to buy goods or services at a
specific price. Ability to buy means that an individual must possess sufficient wealth or income
in order to purchase the goods or services at specific prices. Both factors of demand depend on
the market price.
Consumer behavior is analyzed through utility maximization subject to a budgetary constraint.
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According to this theory, an individual has a utility function, U(x), which is a function of
non-negative commodity vectors, x = (x1, x2… xn), and seeks to maximize U(x) subject to their
budgetary constraint. There is a set of commodities that can achieve utility maximum given the
budget constraint, B(p, w) = {x ∈ X | p · x ≤ w}, where p represents prices and w represents
wealth. Assuming that prices and wealth are strictly positive, the consumer’s problem can be
written as:
Max U(x) s.t. p · x ≤ w.

(3.1.1)

X ≥0

Since this is a constrained maximization problem, the Lagrangian method can be used. The
Lagrangian can be written as:
L = U (x) + λ (w − p · x)

(3.1.2)

Where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
This implies Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions (FOC) of:
Ui (x ∗ ) − λ ∗ pi ≤ 0 and xi (Ui (x ∗ ) − λ ∗ pi) = 0 for i = (1,..., L)
w − p · x ∗ ≥ 0 and λ ∗ (w − p · x ∗ ) = 0

(3.1.3)

Let x ∗ be the utility maximizing commodity vector. If prices and wealth were different, the
utility maximizing point would have been different. For this reason, the endogenous variable, x ∗ ,
is written as a function of prices and wealth, x (p, w) = (x1 (p, w), x2 (p, w)..., xL (p, w)). This
function gives the utility maximizing bundle for any values of p and w, x (p, w) and is called the
consumer’s demand function. A consumer’s demand function represents the amount that a
consumer will purchase as a function of prices and available income (Luenberger, 1995). When
the market price for a product is high, subsequent demand will be low. When price is low,
subsequent demand is high. At depressed prices, many consumers will be able to purchase a
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product. However, people usually only want a limited amount of any one particular good. The
law of diminishing marginal utility states that acquiring additional increments of a good or
service in some time period will contribute decreasing levels of satisfaction. As a result, the
demand for a product at low prices is limited by taste and is not infinite even when the price
equals zero. As the price increases, the same amount of money will purchase fewer goods. When
the price of a good is very high, the demand will decrease because, while consumers may have a
strong desire to purchase a product, they are limited by their ability to buy.
3.1.1.2. Producer Theory
Supply is the relationship between the price of a good and the quantity supplied by producers. In
many ways, supply is analogous to demand. Willingness and ability to supply goods determine
the seller’s actions. Just as consumers constitute the demand side of the product market, firms
represent the supply side. A firm is an economic agent that converts factors of production (land,
labor, and capital) into goods and services. In the process, firms make numerous decisions
including what to produce, how much to produce, what inputs to purchase, and what technology
to use to produce their product. Economists model a firm’s decisions with the goal of
maximizing profit. Every decision impacts the benefits to a firm, and is typically measured in
terms of revenue but also entails cost. The difference between the revenue generated from a
decision and the cost incurred is the profit earned from adopting that particular decision. This
general concept is the same regardless of the decision being analyzed. It is important to
accurately measure the benefits and the costs of various decisions. There are two types of costs
that firms incur. Variable costs are those costs that change directly with output. Fixed costs are
those costs that the firm incurs regardless of how much or how little it chooses to produce. Total
cost is the sum of variable and fixed costs. Another useful measure that helps firms determine
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their level of production is marginal cost, which is the change in total cost after producing an
additional unit of output. In general, profit maximizing firms will produce output until their
marginal cost is just equal to their marginal revenue. At this point, the firm’s profit is
maximized, although it is not guaranteed to be positive.
Producer theory is based on profit maximization. According to this theory, producers will
choose from among all possible alternatives that strategy which maximizes earned profits. In that
case, a firm that is seeking to produce a quantity, q, of an output will look for the set of inputs, z,
that maximizes its profit. The relationship between q and z is given by q = f(z). The profit
maximization problem can be written as:
Max pq – w.z s.t : f(z) ≥ q.
Z ≥0

(3.1.4)

Where p>0 is the price of the output and w = (w1, w2,…, wn) ≥ 0 the n prices of the inputs z.
Since p>0, the constraint is always binding and equation 3.1.4 can be rewritten as an
unconstrained maximization:
Max pq – w.z

(3.1.5)

Z ≥0

This can be translated as the maximization of the difference between the revenue the firm
generates from sales, and the total cost of sold output.
The Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions to maximize (3.1.5) can be derived as follows:
Pfi (z*) - wi ≤ 0
Pfi (z*) - wi = 0 if zi* > 0,  i

(3.1.6)

fi (z*) is the marginal product of input zi, and indicates the amount by which revenue increases if
input zi is increased by a small amount. Thus Pfi (z*) is the amount by which revenue increases if
zi is increased by a small amount and is also referred to as the marginal revenue product. The
optimality condition means that the increase in revenue due to a small increase in zi must be less
32

than the increase in the cost and that when zi* > 0, then the increase in revenue must exactly
equal the increase in cost.
If we consider two inputs zi* and zj* that are strictly positive, 3.1.6 can be rearranged to
give:
fi (z*)/ fj (z*) =

Wi
Wj

(3.1.7)

This means that the marginal rate of technical substitution between two inputs is equal to the
ratio of their price. In addition 3.1.6 can be restated as:
pf ’(z*) = w or f ‘ (z*) =

W
P

(3.1.8)

Solving this problem will lead to the factor demand function z (w, p) which shows how much of
the inputs are used at prices p and w. If z (w, p) is inserted into the production function q = f (z),
it gives q(w,p) = f(z(w,p)), known as the supply function.
At higher prices, more quantity of that respective commodity will be available to buyers.
This is because suppliers will be able to maintain a profit despite the higher costs of production
that may result from short-term expansion of their capacity. In a market, when the inventory is
less than the desired inventory, manufacturers will raise both the supply of their product and its
price. The short-term increase in supply causes manufacturing costs to rise, leading to a further
increase in price. The price change in turn increases the desired rate of production. A similar
effect occurs if inventory is too high. Neoclassical economic theory approximates this
complicated process through the supply curve.
3.1.2. Bilateral Monopoly-Theory Review

A bilateral monopoly situation is said to arise when there is a single seller and a single buyer of a
particular commodity. The seller produces an intermediate product and sells it to the buyer who
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uses it as an input in producing a final output (Gervais and Devadoss). There has been a
historical divergence of opinion concerning the correct outcome under bilateral monopoly and a
clear consensus has yet to emerge. The major source of confusion stems from a failure to
recognize the importance of joint profit maximization through negotiation on both the price and
the quantity of the intermediate good (Blair, Kaserman, and Romano). The description of a
bilateral monopoly characterizes quite well the quota market which this analysis seeks to model.
Suppose that countries which are no longer competitive under the prevailing EU price ( quota
sellers) stop producing and instead sell their quota rights to the countries that can still make
profit (quota buyers). These quota rights serve as an intermediate product for the buyer who will
then use it to produce the final output, which is sugar. Because the ACP sugar protocol is
between the EU and a specific number of countries, the sellers possess the quota and are the only
ones that can sell them. Likewise, there are a limited number of buyers.
The general model is defined as follows: The seller has q amount of the intermediate
product available to sell to the buyer who will use it to produce y amount of output. One unit of q
allows for the production of one unit of y. Per unit prices of q and y are respectively, p and r. The
seller’s profit π s and the buyer’s profit π b are given by

π s = pq – c1(q)

(3.1.9)

π b = rf(q) – c2(q) - pq

(3.1.10)

Where c1(q) represents the seller’s cost function, c2(q) is the buyer’s cost function and f(q)
represents buyer’s production function.
Four different cases can arise in the determination of equilibrium quantity and price:
1- The monopoly case in which the seller dominates the market and makes the buyer accept
his price and quantity decisions.
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2- The monopsony case in which the buyer dominates the market and forces the seller to
follow his price and quantity decisions.
3- Collusion by the seller and the buyer in which they determine the equilibrium quantity
and price by maximizing their joint profit.
4- Noncooperation by the seller and the buyer which results in market failure.
Let us examine each case individually:
Monopoly Case
Suppose the buyer can dictate the price of the intermediate product: The seller will offer
q units so that q maximizes pq – c1(q), p being given.
Max (pq – c1(q))
p

(3.1.11)

dπs
= p-c1’(q) = 0  p = c1’(q) = Offer schedule
dq

(3.1.12)

The seller’s gain would then be c1’(q) q - c1(q)

(3.1.13)

The buyer who is then limited by the seller’s offer schedule and demand for y dictates p which
will maximize rf(q) – c2(q)- pq = rf(q) – c2(q) - c1’(q) q
dπb
= rf’(q) - c’2(q) – c’1 (q) – q c''1 (q) =0
dq

(3.1.14)

This equation is solved for q* and the value of q* is replaced in the offer schedule to obtain p*.
We can now determine the gain to the buyer which is rf(q*) – c2(q*) – p*q*.
Monopsony case
Suppose the seller of the intermediate product can dictate its price p to the buyer. The
buyer maximizes its profit rf(q) – c2(q) – pq for a given p.

dπ s
= rf’(q) – c’2(q) – p =0  p = rf’(q) – c’2(q) = demand schedule
dq
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(3.1.15)

The buyer’s gain is then rf(q) – c2(q) – (rf’(q) – c’2(q))q.

(3.1.16)

The seller, who is then limited by the buyer’s demand schedule and his own cost schedule,
dictates the value of p which will maximize pq – c1(q) = (rf’(q) – c’2(q)) q - c1(q)
dπ s
= (rf’’(q) – c’’2(q))q + (rf’(q) – c’2(q)) - c’1 (q) = 0
dq

(3.1.17)

This equation is solved to determine q* and the value of q* is replaces q in the demand schedule
to obtain p*.
We can now determine the seller’s gain: p*q* – c1(q*)
Collusion
Suppose that the buyer and the seller of a quota combine to maximize their joint gain
through bargaining. Many authors reported that optimality in the case of a bilateral monopoly
requires joint profit maximization. Henderson and Quandt argue that the bargaining process can
be separated into two steps. First, participants determine a quantity that maximizes their joint
profit, and then, secondly, determine a price that distributes the joint profit among them.
Joint profit is given by:

π = π s + π b = [rf(q) – c2(q) - pq] + [pq – c1(q)] = rf(q) – c2(q) – c1(q)

(3.1.18)

Joint profit maximization provides only the optimum quantity. Price has to be determined
through negotiation.

dπ
= rf’(q) - c’2(q) - c’1 (q)=0  rf’(q) - c’2(q) = c’1 (q)
dq

(3.1.19)

Equation (3.1.19) shows that the optimal collusive output, q*, is obtained by equating the seller’s
marginal cost to the buyer’s marginal value product. For the prescribed quantity, the seller
desires the highest possible price and the buyer desires the lowest possible price. Price cannot be
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set beyond the price that would force the buyer’s profit to zero which is equal to

rf (q ) − c 2 (q )
q

and represents the upper limit and the condition that would force the seller’s profit to zero is
equal to

c1 (q )
and represents the lower limit because a negative profit would force one of the
q

firms to discontinue operations. The determination of a specific price within the bargaining limits
will depend upon the relative bargaining power of the buyer and seller (Henderson and
Quandt).The incentive to pursue joint profit maximization arises because joint profits are not
maximized at either of the two boundaries solutions presented in the above standard analysis
(Blair, Kaserman, and Romano).
Non-cooperation
This is the case where neither seller nor buyer is willing to behave as a price taker which may
lead to market breakdown.
3.2. Methodology
3.2.1. Supply and Demand Estimation
The Nerlove model has been widely used to examine supply and demand responses to price and
other incentives. Nerlove (1958) distinguished between short-run and long-run supply and
demand elasticities and argues that it is impossible to measure the short-run elasticity of supply
or demand and that the long-run elasticity can be measured under special conditions. He
concludes that there is no unique short-run elasticity of supply or demand with respect to price or
any other variable because short-run elasticity differs depending on the position from which we
start and the length of time we allow for adjustment. He goes on to point out that “whenever it
takes time for producers or consumers to adjust to changed conditions and wherever the period
which is required for full adjustment exceeds the interval of observation, then statistical
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relationships among observations on the relevant variables, each of which is taken at the same
time, tell us little about the long-run elasticity or any of the short-run elasticities.” A distributed
lag model was introduced as a suitable method for analyzing dynamic models of consumer and
producer behavior. The Nerlove models of demand and supply are, respectively:
Qt = aγPt + bγYt + (1 - γ) Qt-1 + cγ

(3.2.1)

Xt = dγPt-1 + (1 - γ) Xt-1 + e, where

(3.2.2)

With Qt represents Current quantity consumed or its logarithm, Pt represents Current price or its
logarithm, Pt-1represents Price of the commodity lagged one year, Yt represents Current income
or its logarithm, γ represents Constant of proportionality which is the elasticity or coefficient of
adjustment according to whether quantity is expressed in logarithms or not, a and d represents
Long-run price elasticity, b represents Long-run income elasticity, c represents Constant, Xt
represents Current planned output, Xt-1 represents Current planned output lagged one year.
This model has been modified and extensively revised by numerous authors that were
investigating the supply and demand function.
In this study, the structure of the country’s model framework includes behavioral
equations for area harvested, yield, and production on the supply side, and per capita
consumption and ending stocks on the demand side. All of the countries in the ACP sugar group
have trade relations with countries other than EU countries. In some cases, the volume of exports
to those countries is higher than their quota. It is therefore important to determine whether these
countries respond to world prices or EU prices.
The general framework for each country’s model consists of the following:
Area Harvested at time t
AHt = f(AHt-1, Pt-1, t)

(3.2.3)
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Yield at time t
Yt = f(Yt-1, t)

(3.2.4)

Production at time t
PRDt = AHt* Yt

(3.2.5)

Where AHt is acreage harvvested at time t, AHt-1 is lagged area harvested, Pt-1 is lagged producer
price at time t, Yt is yield at time t, Yt-1 is lagged yield, PRDt is production at time t. Yield
improvements are captured by the time trend.
Per capita consumption at time t
PCCt = f(Pt, PCIt, PCCt-1)

(3.2.6)

With PCCt being per capita consumption at time t, Pt is the real consumer price of raw sugar at
time t and PCIt representing real income per capita at time t. Total demand is the product of the
population and per capita consumption. The consumer price index is used to change nominal
variables into real variables.
Inventory demand at time t is
ESt = f(ESt-1, PRDt, CONt, EXPt, Pt)

(3.2.7)

With ESt representing ending stock at time t, CONt representing consumption at time t , PRDt is
production at time t, EXPt is exports at time t and Pt is the producer price at time t.
Data for area harvested, yield and sugarcane production were gathered from the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, and data for sugar production,
consumption and ending stocks were obtained from Production, Supply and Distribution (PS&D)
View of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Macroeconomic data such as real
GDP, consumer price index, population and exchange rates were gathered from various sources
including the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Price data were obtained from the
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USDA and the World Bank. The time period considered is from 1975 to 2005.
3.2.2. Derivation of Transfer Benefits
This study assumes that world price is exogenously given, implying that the EU sugar reform is
represented as lowering only domestic and preferential prices, and leading to a net income
reduction for all protocol countries. We initially estimate the profit of ACP sugar protocol
exporters associated with the old regime. We derive the estimates using the notion of a profit
function. Next we estimate the profit associated with the EU sugar reform. This will allow us to
assess the competitiveness of the ACP sugar protocol exporters and determine the countries that
are going to cease their sugar production.
The methodology that we use to identify the net transfer benefit to the ACP countries of
the sugar protocol before and after reform is different from earlier studies. Most previous studies
identified the gross transfer benefit under the protocol (Milner, Morgan and Zgovu) but, in our
study, we depart from this approach and estimate the net transfer benefit based on the notion of
profit. Our purpose is to first show the actual benefit that ACP countries are getting and then
examine how the CAP sugar reform is going to affect their net gain. We consider the sugar
industry in each country as a firm without disaggregating individual farmers. Furthermore, we
assume that each industry behaves as a profit maximizing firm. The assumption of profit
maximization is used to predict which countries will continue operating their sugar industry and
which countries will cease sugar production. We use the profit function property that suggests
that there be no losses (i.e.   0) as a way to determine the countries decisions. This means that
an industry will not tolerate negative profit. In other words, if faced with negative profit, an
industry will stop all production. The firm’s profit, , is the difference between revenue and cost.
Here revenue is the unit price times quantity: R = PQ. The cost is transaction cost plus
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production cost. This gives:
 = R(q) – C(q)

(3.2.8)

3.2.3. A Model of Trade of Quota Rights
The sugar industries of the ACP sugar protocol countries face severe challenges in the coming
years as a result of the EU sugar policy reform. There are some countries that will not be able to
survive the reform and some that will survive but will see their export revenues reduced. The
countries that are no longer profitable may continue to support their sugar industries for a time,
but will eventually be cease production.
The model of quota trade developed allows for the countries that can no longer profitably
export to the European Union to sell their quota rights to the countries that are still able to make
profit. This alternative is very promising in that it will give the potential sellers the opportunity
to immediately obtain revenues that can be used for diversification away from sugar. However
because in the past when a country was unable to fulfill its quota rights, the European Union
would divide the amount among the active countries, the potential buyers might be tempted to
wait for the high cost producing countries to close their sugar industries so that they can benefit
from a redistribution of their quota as it has always been. Even so, there are many reasons for
the potential buyer to want to participate in the negotiations. First, it is likely that the potential
sellers will not close their sugar industries at the same time making it more profitable for the
potential buyers to consider the quota market model which will allow them to get additional
revenue quickly and adjust to the loss of revenues that they will be experiencing. This also opens
up the possibility of production expansion and ultimately cost reduction and, hence, more profits.
Second, there is the risk that the European Union will further reform its sugar policy. There has
been pressure for the European Union to completely eliminate its exports subsidies and in the
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event that this happens, the price will decrease further. As a result, the ACP sugar protocol
countries will experience further reduction in their exports revenues. Given this, it may be
important for the potential buyers to take advantage of the opportunities that they now have
because there is no telling what the future holds.
The analysis is an adaptation of the above standard joint profit maximization model.
Following the work of Dasgupta and Devadoss, we assume unequal bargaining power. The cause
of differential market power is attributed to the fact that the buyer may find a substitute market
which is the rest of the world. In fact the buyer can give up the option to buy the quota from the
other ACP countries and increase sales to the EU and decide to produce and sell its product on
the world market. The seller, in contrast, does not have an alternative market for its quota rights
other than the sugar protocol countries. Having the world market as an alternative gives buyers
slightly superior bargaining power. Because the world market price of sugar is volatile, ACP
sugar protocol countries face volatile export earnings. With price stability being the major goal
of the EU agricultural policy, ACP countries gain from the preferential agreement because of
stabilized export earnings (Herrmann, Weiss). Furthermore, we suppose that the substitute world
market is imperfect, which is consistent with the need for collusion where the buyer has to
negotiate with the seller because of the opportunity to get a higher mark up through the ACP
sugar protocol. Therefore, despite the availability of other markets, the underlying bilateral
monopoly structure is unchanged beyond inducing unequal bargaining powers.
Following Dasgupta and Devadoss, we assume that the buyer and the seller determine the
optimal price and quantity profile of the intermediate product by maximizing the product of each
party’s profits, weighted by their respective bargaining powers.
Let  (01) and (1- ) represent the seller’s and buyer’s bargaining power, respectively.
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Max π s . π

(1-)
b

= [pq – c1(q)] . [rf(q) - pq – c2(q)](1-)

(3.2.9)

The first order condition with respect to price of the intermediate product is:
.p [pq – c1(q)]-1 . [rf(q) - pq – c2(q)](1-) - (1- ).p [rf(q) - pq – c2(q)]- . [pq – c1(q)] =0
.p π -1s . π

(1-)
b
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β

1
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πb
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1− β

- (1- ).p π b . π s = 0





1− β

1− β  π s

=
β (1 − β )  π b

1 π
=  s
β πb









β

β

(3.2.10)

If we substitute q* into (3.2.10) for q and solve for the intermediate product’s price, the solution
is:
1
1− β

 rf (q*) − pq * −c 2 (q*) 


pq * −c1 (q*)



1− β


pq * −c1 (q*)
1

= 
β  rf (q*) − pq * −c 2 (q*) 

β

(rf (q*) − pq * −c 2 (q*))1− β
( pq * −c1 (q*)) β
=
(1 − β )( pq * −c1 (q*))1− β
β (rf (q*) − pq * −c 2 (q*)) β
 .(rf(q*) – pq* – c2(q*)) = (1- ). (pq* – c1(q*))
 rf(q*) –  pq* –  c2(q*) = (1- ) . pq* – (1- ) . c1(q*)
 rf(q*) –  c2(q*) + (1- ) . c1(q*) = (1- ) . pq* +  pq*
 rf(q*) –  c2(q*) + (1- ) . c1(q*) = pq*

β

rf (q*) − c 2 (q*)
c (q*)
+ (1 − β ) 1
= p*
q*
q*

(3.2.11)

Thus the price of the intermediate product is dependent on .
We can now derive the buyer’s and the seller’s profit corresponding to p* and q*:

π s ( p*, q*) = p*q* - c1(q*)
= [ (rf(q*)– c2(q*)) + (1- ) c1(q*)] - c1(q*)
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= [rf(q*)– c2(q*) - c1(q*)] =  π

(3.2.12)

π b ( p*, q*) = rf(q*) – p*q* – c2(q*)
= rf(q*) - [ (rf(q*)– c2(q*)) + (1- ) c1(q*)] – c2(q*)
= (1- ) [rf(q*)– c2(q*)– c1(q*) ] = (1- ) π

(3.2.13)

Equations (3.2.12) and (3.2.13) show that seller and buyer divide total profits proportional to
their respective bargaining power. Furthermore, it shows that the country with superior
bargaining power receives a greater share of the total profit, proportional to its bargaining power.
This result will be used to determine the bargaining powers and then determine prices and profits
that prevail in each case.
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CHAPTER4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
4.1. Econometric Estimation
4.1.1. Model Specification and Validation
This section examines the supply and demand responsiveness of fourteen of the ACP countries to
the sugar protocol. Annual data for 1975 through 2005 are used for the analysis. The general
supply and demand models outlined previously were estimated for these 14 countries that are
still active in the sugar protocol. Adjustments to the standard models have been made in some
cases in order to get satisfactory results. To determine whether autocorrelation correction is
needed, the Durbin Watson or Durbin h statistics were used. The Durbin Watson test is a widely
used method of testing for autocorrelation but when lagged dependent variables are included as
explanatory variables, the Durbin Watson statistic is not valid, and the appropriate test statistic is
the Durbin h statistic.
4.1.1.1 Time Series Data and Autocorrelation
Economic time series are often characterized by autocorrelation. Autocorrelation occurs when
the error term observations in a regression are correlated. When autocorrelation is present, the
OLS estimates do not have the minimum variance (not efficient estimates). Also OLS will
underestimate the standard errors of the coefficients leading to larger t-statistics and incorrect
decisions in hypothesis testing.
4.1.1.2 The Durbin-Watson, the Durbin h and t Tests
The Durbin-Watson test, first published in 1950, has been found to be extremely useful in testing
for serial correlation. Consider the residuals et from an OLS regression with T observations. To
test H0 that the errors are uncorrelated against the alternative hypothesis H1 that the errors are AR
(1), the DW test statistic is defined as:
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(4.1.1.1)
The cutoff between the acceptance and the rejection region is not clear, as an inconclusive region
is present. Therefore, the DW test relies on two limits, dl and du. In a two-tailed test, where both
positive and negative autocorrelation are tested, the null hypothesis (of absence of serial
correlation) is rejected for values of d below dl or above 4- dl, and we fail to reject the null
hypothesis for values between du and 4 - du. The test is inconclusive for values between dl and du
or between 4- du and 4- dl.
When an explanatory variable in the regression is a lagged dependent variable, the DW
statistic will be biased toward 2 (acceptance of the null hypothesis) even when the errors are
serially correlated. In order to solve this problem, Durbin (1970) proposed a modification, the h
test, which under the null hypothesis is approximately normally distributed with unit variance.
The test statistic is defined as:
(4.1.1.2)
Where

is the estimated variance of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and T is

the sample size in the regression.
Durbin’s h test cannot be used for T

≥ 1. In this case, Durbin (1970) proposed another

statistic, the t test. The latter consists of performing the original OLS regression, collecting the
residuals and running the following regression:
et = β1 + β2Xt + β3Yt-1 + β4et-1 + µt

(4.1.1.3)

Where Yt-1 is the lagged dependent variable, and Xt is the (vector of) independent variable(s).
Serial correlation is tested by using the t-value of the β4 coefficient.
4.1.2 Empirical Estimation Results
4.1.2.1 Supply Response
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This section presents the results of the estimation of the supply function. This is done to
determine the factors that affect the decisions of farmers in the ACP sugar protocol countries.
The regression for some countries showed the presence of autocorrelation and, in order to deal
with this issue, we assumed that the error terms follow a first-order autoregressive pattern 1. The
maximum likelihood was used as an estimation technique. Estimations were made with both
linear and log-linear formulations and the results are mostly reported in linear formulations but in
some cases the log linear formulations were reported because they yielded better results.
Different functional forms give parameter estimates that have different economic interpretation.
The parameters of the linear model have an interpretation as marginal effects. The elasticities
will vary depending on the data. In contrast, the parameters of the log-log model are directly
interpreted as elasticities. So the log-log model assumes a constant elasticity over all values of
the data set.
Four standard linear and log linear specifications of area harvested and two standard
linear and log linear specifications of yield are estimated for each country 2. Equations 4.1.2.1
through 4.1.2.4 are the area harvested equations and the yield equations are given as 4.1.2.5 and
4.1.2.6.
AHt = AHt (AHt-1, PEUt-1, T)

(4.1.2.1)

AHt = AHt (AHt-1, PWt-1, T)

(4.1.2.2)

AHt = AHt (AHt-1, PEUt-1)

(4.1.2.3)

AHt = AHt (AHt-1, PWt-1)

(4.1.2.4)

Yt = Yt (Yt-1, T)

(4.1.2.5)

Yt = Yt (T)

(4.1.2.6)

1

2

The assumption of the first order autoregressive pattern was made since we are only using a one year lag.
For a detailed discussion on the different specifications of the supply model see Askari and Cummings (1977).
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Where AHt is acreage harvested at time t (hectares), AHt-1 is lagged area harvested, PEUt-1 and
PWt-1 are respectively the lagged EU and World sugar price converted using the real exchange
rate or CPI of the country in question, Yt is yield at time t (hectogram per hectares),Yt-1 is lagged
yield, and T denoting time period. PEU and PW are either in Local currency per pound or cents
per pound depending on whether the exchange rates or the consumer price indexes were used.
Dummies were included in the equations whenever the estimation results did not perform as
expected. The parameter estimates are shown in the results below.
4.1.2.1.1 Area Harvested
In the area harvested equation, the coefficient of lagged area harvested is positive and
significantly different from 0 for twelve (Barbados, Belize, Ivory Coast, Congo, Fiji,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe) of
the fourteen countries studied. The sign of the coefficient implies a positive lag distribution of
area harvested. The exceptions are Guyana and Jamaica, where the estimated coefficient is not
statistically different from zero. The price coefficient showed mixed results. It is positive and
statistically different form zero in Barbados, Belize, Ivory Coast, Guyana, Jamaica, Swaziland,
and Trinidad and Tobago, implying that producers are responsive to price in these countries. In
Fiji, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe the price coefficient is positive
and not significant, but negative and not significant in Congo. This finding can be interpreted to
show that supply is not responsive to price in these countries. This might be explained by the fact
that the price and quantities have already been negotiated in the sugar protocol and the
production by these countries is for the preferential markets provided by the EU and U.S. quotas.
Therefore, it is possible that these countries make their production plans without taking into
account the fluctuations in price because they have a guaranteed price.
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Table 4.1.2.1. Coefficient estimates of the area harvested and yield
Barbados
Yt = 514690 + 0.17Yt-1 - 2822 T
(4.29)*** (0.91)
(-2.09) **
N = 31
R2 = 0.2356
Dt= 1.1591
AHt = -366.12 + 0.93 AHt-1 + 1182 PEUt-1
(-1.28) (28.58)*** (2.49) **
N = 31
R2 = 0.9870
Dh= - 2.6271
Belize
Yt = 572492 - 0.49Yt-1 + 4444 T
(8.46)*** (-3.14) ***
(2.87) ***
N = 31
R2 = 0.3662
Dt= 0.6220
LnAHt = 3.45 + 0.66 LnA Ht-1 + 0.08 LnPEUt-1 - 0.0006 T
(3.28)*** (6.39) ***
(2.00)*
(-0.95)
N = 31
R2 = 0.7431
Dt =-0.5226
Ivory Coast
Yt = 45427 + 0.28Yt-1 + 0.10T
(4.84)*** (1.85)* (0.00)
N = 31
R2 = 0.1246
Dh= 1.2880
LnAHt = 1.15+ 0.82LnA Ht-1 + 0. 18LnPEUt-1
(1.13)
(11.29) ***
(1.59)
N = 31
R2 = 0.8683 Dh = 1.4970
Congo
Yt = 10678 + 0.77Yt-1 - 41.24 T
(1.72)*
(6.86) *** (-0.44)
N = 31
R2 = 0.7199
AHt = 6261+ 0.95A Ht-1 - 20.62PEUt-1
(2.33)** (30.93)***
(-1.59)
N = 31
R2 = 0.9750
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance
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Table 4.1.2.1. continued
Fiji
Yt = 88058 - 0.60Yt-1 - 313.49T
(9.89)*** (-3.84)*** (-2.33)**
N = 31
R2 = 0.4106
Dt= - 0.5953
LnAHt= 2.58 + 0.77 LnA Ht-1 + 0.09LnPEUt-1
(2.76)**
(8.96)***
(0.96)
N = 31
R2 = 0.7861
Dh= - 1.8687
Guyana
Yt = 76883 - 494.43T
(26.72)*** (-3.17)***
N = 31
R2 = 0.27

DW=0.9484

AHt = 49774 - 0.12A Ht-1 + 6.14PWt-1
(6.66)*** (-0.78)
(3.72)***
N = 31
R2 = 0.3634
Dh= 0.9816
Jamaica
Yt = 39431+ 0.40Yt-1 - 236.48 T
(3.30)*** (2.20)** (-1.90)*
N = 31
R2 = 0.3473

Dt= 0.1713

AHt = 21005 - 0.22 AHt-1 + 49.38PEUt-1 + 913.52T
(2.16)** (-1.55)
(5.25) ***
(2.87) ***
N = 31
R2 = 0.6333
Dt=0.5648
Madagascar
Yt = 13262+ 0.69Yt-1 + 311.54T
(2.43)** (4.78) *** (1.50)
N = 31
R2 = 0.8677

Dt=-0.2691

AHt = 0.58+ 0.94A Ht-1 + 0.006PEUt-1 - 0.53DUM82 + 0.37DUM83
(0.56) (10.95)***
(0.30)
(-11.62)***
(6.84)***
N = 31
R2 = 0.9659
Dh=1.9790
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable
DW is the Durbin’s Watson statistic
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance
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Table 4.1.2.1. continued
Malawi
Yt = 48982 + 0.58Yt-1 - 200.92 T
(2.71)** (3.69)*** (-1.61)
N = 31
R2 = 0.5525

Dt= 0.1118

LnAHt = 5.20 + 0.37LnAHt-1 + 0.08LnPEUt-1 + 0.03LnT
(3.97)*** (2.16)**
(1.45)
(2.29)**
N = 31
R2 = 0.9033
Dh=0.5834
Mauritius
Yt = 802026 - 0.10Yt-1 + 39.04T -139646DUM99
(7.24)*** (-0.66)
(0.05)
(-2.74)**
N = 31
R2 = 0.3318)
Dh= 0.1732
AHt = 2175+ 0.96A Ht-1 + 47.93PEUt-1
(0.34) (10.34)***
(0.88)
N = 31
R2 = 0.95
DW=1.92
Swaziland
Yt = 107320 - 323.88T
(39.03)*** (-2.18) **
N = 31
R2 = 0.1495

DW=0.9552

LnAHt = 1.11+ 0.88LnA Ht-1 + 0.05LnPWt-1 + 0.006LnT
(1.06) (8.82)***
(1.54)
(1.93)*
N = 31
R2 = 0.9640
Dh=1.3468
Tanzania
Yt = 20487 + 0.73Yt-1 + 354.2 T
(2.36)** (5.70)*** (1.05)
N = 31
R2 = 0.7563

Dh=1.3972

AHt = 3997 + 0.73AHt-1 + 0.14 PWt-1
(2.26)** (6.49)***
(1.17)
N = 31
R2 = 0.7890
Dh=1.6746
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance
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Table 4.1.2.1. continued
Trinidad
Yt = 78832 - 0.39Yt-1 - 79.97T
(6.87)*** (-2.19)** (-0.24)
N = 31
R2 = 0.1639

Dh= 1.3297

AHt = 7555 + 0.36AHt-1 + 1460PEUt-1
(2.05)* (1.94)*
(2.55)**
N = 31
R2 = 0.5371
Dh= 3.3861
Zimbabwe
Yt = 121577 -0.08Yt-1 -811.18T- 99512DUM84- -50108DUM85
(6.17)*** (-0.47) (-3.39)*** (-10.86)***
(-2.43)**
N = 31
R2 = 0.9174
Dh= -0.6935
AHt = 5803 + 0.67LAHt-1 + 1.82 LPWt-1 + 285.17T
(1.16) (4.51)***
(0.63)
(1.53)
N = 31
R2 = 0.6930
Dh= 1.7265
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance
4.1.2.1.2 Yield
The yield equation was estimated using lagged yield and/or time. The lag distribution was
positive and significant for Ivory Coast, Congo, Jamaica, Madagascar, Malawi, and Tanzania
suggesting that the first lagged value of yield helps predict current yield. However, three
countries (Belize, Fiji, and Trinidad and Tobago) showed a negative and significant lag
distribution implying that yield follows a decline through time. The coefficient of the lagged
variable was not significant for Barbados, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe. The estimated time trend
variable used to capture technological improvement is positive and significant in only one
country (Belize) implying that there was technological advancement in Belize’s sugar industry.
Interestingly, the coefficient was negative and significant in Barbados, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica,
Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. It was not significant in Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritius,
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Tanzania, Congo, Malawi, and Trinidad and Tobago. This suggests that there might have been
some natural disasters, neglect or a deterioration of the infrastructure in those countries sugar
industries. For instance, Gafar, while estimating the supply responsiveness of Trinidad for sugar
cane found that the trend variable was negative and pointed that the Caribbean sugar industry
had not had any major capital investment designed to prevent soil erosion, improve irrigation,
develop new varieties of sugar cane, or educate farmers on good practices. The obtained results
provide strong support for the view that the sugar protocol did not improve the sugar industries
of the ACP countries.
4.1.2.2 Demand
The procedure was similar to the supply case. Similar to the area harvested, we have three
different linear and log linear specifications of ending stocks for each country. Equations 4.1.2.7
through 4.1.2.9 are the ending stock equations, and per capita consumption is given as 4.1.2.10.
The formulations that yielded acceptable results are the ones that are being presented. A time
trend and dummies were included in the equations whenever the estimation results did not
perform as expected.
ESt = ESt (ESt-1, PRDt, CONt, EXPt, PEUt )

(4.1.2.7)

ESt = ESt (ESt-1, PRDt, CONt, EXPt, PWt )

(4.1.2.8)

ESt = ESt (ESt-1, PRDt, CONt, EXPt)

(4.1.2.9)

PCCt = PCCt (PCCt-1, PCIt, Pt)

(4.1.2.10)

With ESt representing ending stock at time t (tonnes), CONt representing consumption at time t
(tonnes), PRDt is production at time t (tonnes), EXPt is exports at time t (tonnes). PEUt and PWt
are EU and world price at time t respectively expressed in local currency per pound or cent per
pound. PCCt is per capita consumption at time t (tonnes), Pt is the real consumer price of raw
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sugar at time t (cent per pound), and PCIt representing real income per capita at time t (US
dollars). ESt-1 and PCCt-1 are lagged ending stock and per capita consumption respectively.
4.1.2.2.1 Per Capita Consumption
The estimated lag variable of per capita consumption was positive and statistically different from
zero for all of the countries studied. The results of per capita income are significantly different
from zero and have the expected sign (positive) for Barbados, Congo, Fiji, Jamaica, Malawi,
Swaziland, and Tanzania. For the linear formulation this translates into: A dollar increase in
income will increase sugar consumption by x tons (x being the value of the coefficient). The log
linear formulation can be interpreted as follows: A one per cent increase in income will increase
consumption by x per cent with x being the value of the coefficient. Unfortunately, the
coefficient for income was not significant in Belize, Ivory Coast, Guyana, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. This suggests that consumption is not income
elastic in these countries. The coefficients of price are as expected (negative) and significantly
different from zero in Barbados, Congo, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Perhaps the most
surprising result is that the coefficient was positive and significant in Guyana and Mauritius
suggesting that as price went up consumption went up in those countries. The coefficient was not
significant in Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Belize, Fiji, Madagascar, Malawi, Swaziland, and
Zimbabwe implying a non- responsiveness of consumption to price in these countries. One
explanation of consumers’ non-sensitivity to price might be that there is no readily available
substitute for sugar in these countries.
4.1.2.2.2 Ending Stock
In the ending stock equation, the coefficient for lag ending stock is positive and statistically
different from zero for Barbados, Belize, Ivory Coast, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Madagascar,
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Table 4.1.2.2 Coefficient estimates for consumption and ending stock
Barbados
LnPCCt = - 16.02 + 0.47LnPCCt-1 + 1.91LnPCIt - 0.20LnPt - 0.02T
(-2.17)** (2.93)***
(2.43)**
(-1.80)* (-2.36)**
N=31 R2 = 0.51
Dh= 2.1792
ESt = 15989 + 0.40ESt-1+ 0.56PRDt - 0.86CONt - 0.6EXPt
(3.88)*** (2.67)**
(7.35)*** (-3.70) *** (-3.13)***
N=31 R2 = 0.7651
Dh= 2.9964
Belize
LnPCCt = 1.44+ 0.55LnPCCt-1 + 0.06 LnPCIt + 0.05 LnPt + 0.41 DUM86
(0.73)
(3.37)***
(0.28)
(1.16)
(3.85)***
N=31
R2 = 0.5161
Dt= 0.4526
ESt = 7755 + 0.98ESt-1 - 0.83CONt + 1.03PRDt -1.06EXPt - 3.85PEUt
(1.77)* (13.10) *** (-2.06)*
(12.63)*** (-12.27)*** (-1.37)
N=31
R2 = 0.9542
Dh= 0.5872
Ivory Coast
LnPCCt = 0.73 + 0.76LnPCCt-1 + 0.01LnPCIt - 0.06LnPt
(0.46) (4.99)***
(0.07)
(-1.24)
N=31
R2 =0.7692
Dh= - 2.1382
LnES = 6.96 + 0.82LnESt-1 - 0.89LnCONt + 0.64 LnPRDt - 0.46 LnPWt
(2.59)** (7.12)***
(-3.10)***
(3.80)***
(-2.69)**
N= 31
R2 = 0.8867
Dt= -1.8441
Congo
LnPCCt = 0.2 + 0.83LnPCCt-1 + 0.08LnPCIt - 0.1LnPt
(0.81) (9.87) ***
(1.73)*
(-2.89) ***
2
N= 31
R = 0.8326
Dh= -1.6381
ESt = - 30786+ 0.63ESt-1 - 0.38CONt + 1.51PRDt - 125.78PWt
(-1.55)
(5.41)*** (-2.95) *** (3.52) ***
(-1.74)*
N=31 R2 = 0.8988
Dh= - 0.1191
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance
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Table 4.1.2.2 continued
Fiji
PCCt = - 0.23 + 0.41LnPCCt-1 + 0.33LnPCIt + 0.005LnPt
(-0.16) (1.93)*
(1.78)*
(0.15)
N= 31
R2 = 0.3116
Dt= 0.5629
ESt = 18363 + 0.94ESt-1 - 0.30CONt + 0.8PRDt - 0.91EXPt -12.86PEUt
(1.02)
(14.01)*** (-1.52)
(15.85)*** (-16.70)*** (-1.44)
N= 31
R2 = 0.9617
Dh= - 0.3122
Guyana
LnPCCt = 0.97+ 0.50LnPCCt-1 + 0.1LnPCIt + 0.05LnPt
(1.03) (2.87) ***
(0.92)
(3.06)***
N= 31
R2 = 0.7617
Dt= 0.8076
ESt = 31385 + 0.99ESt-1 - 0.85CONt + 0.89PRDt - 0.98EXPt - 4.96PEUt
(2.78)*** (32.71)*** (-2.90)*** (12.94)*** (-10.12)*** (-2.14)**
N= 31
R2 = 0.9917
Dh= -0.0453
Jamaica
LnPCCt = 0.12+ 0.86LnLPCCt-1 + 0.06LnPCIt - 0.05LnPt
(0.24) (7.84) ***
(2.34)**
(-2.40)**
2
N= 31
R = 0.7396
Dh=2.2020
ESt = 41238 + 0.36ESt-1 - 0.44CONt + 0.30PRDt - 0.23EXPt - 25.06PEUt
(3.51)*** (3.47)*** (-3.76)***
(7.29)*** (-6.92)*** (-4.07)***
N= 31
R2 = 0.9401
Dh= -1.6609
Madagascar
PCCt = 3.40 + 0.51 LPCCt-1 + 0.00004PCIt + 0.0014Pt
(3.61)*** (3.90)***
(1.58)
(1.49)
N= 31
R2 = 0.9052
Dh= -1.0570
ESt = 3.72 + 0.93ESt-1 - 0.05CONt + 0.19PRDt - 0.44EXPt - 0.02PEUt
(0.81) (5.46) ***
(-0.12)
( 1.18) (-3.45) ***
(- 0.11)
N= 31
R2 = 0.9581
Dt= - 0.5208
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic
Dt is the Durbin’s t statistic
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance
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Table 4.1.2.2 continued
Malawi
LnPCCt = -1.36 + 1.05LnPCCt-1 + 0.11LnPCIt + 0.01LnPt + 0.02T
(-2.75)** (13.37) ***
(2.02)*
(0.31) (2.11)**
N= 31
R2 = 0.9764
Dh= -1.0320
LnESt = 7.70 + 0.55LnESt-1 - 1.47LnCONt + 1.68LnPRDt - 0.44LnEXPt - 0.33LnPWt
(1.32)
(3.70) ***
(-4.18) ***
(3.30) ***
(-2.69)**
(-2.35)**
N= 31
R2 = 0.7765
Dh= 0.6540
Mauritius
LnPCCt = 1.08+ 0.63LnPCCt-1 + 0.02LnPCIt + 0.02LnPt
(2.56)**
(5.64)***
(0.98)
(1.94)*
N=31
R2 = 0.9138
Dh= -1.3631
LnESt = - 21.77+ 0.69LnESt-1 - 0.05LnCONt + 6.61LnPRDt - 4.59LnEXPt - 1.01LnPEUt
(-0.70) (5.08) ***
(0.02)
(3.43) ***
(-1.82) *
(-2.02)*
N= 31
R2 = 0.7685
Dh= - 0.4816
Swaziland
LnPCCt = - 6.37 + 0.84LnPCCt-1 + 0.94LnPCIt + 0.03LnPt
(-1.83)* (8.69) ***
(1.93)*
(0.44)
2
N=31
R = 0.9477
Dh=0.1766
ESt = 3699 + 0.81ESt-1 - 0.85CONt + 0.88PRDt - 0.88EXPt - 154.43PEUt
(0.46) (15.29) *** (-21.83) *** (31.56) *** (-27.71)***
(-0.44)
N= 31
R2 = 0.9936
Dh= 1.0383
Tanzania
PCCt = - 2.38+ 0.73PCCt-1 + 0.02PCIt - 0.00003Pt
(-1.13)
(5.21)*** (2.04)**
(-0.61)
2
N= 31
R = 0.7227
Dh= - 0.0432
LnESt = 28.45 + 1.34LnESt-1 - 2.97LnCONt + 1.26LnPRDt - 0.69LnEXPt - 0.64LnPEUt
(6.02)*** (15.13) *** (-5.00) ***
(2.97) ***
(-5.68)***
(-3.33) ***
+ 0.02T
(0.88)
N= 31
R2 = 0.9823
Dh=-2.5576
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance
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Table 4.1.2.2 continued
Trinidad
PCCt = 24.38 + 0.49PCCt-1 + 0.0007PCI - 0.75P
(2.94)*** (3.13) *** (0.92)
(-2.11) **
N= 31
R2 = 0.5693
Dh= 0.2746
ESt = 8940 - 0.17 ESt-1 -0.06CONt + 0.23 PRDt -0.26 EXPt -26.86PEUt
(0.43) (-0.91)
(-0.24)
(2.66)**
(-2.28)** (-0.31)
2
N= 31
R = 0.3546
Dh= 1.9685
Zimbabwe
PCCt = -3.69+ 0.92PCCt-1 + 0.12PCIt + 0.0005Pt
(-0.57) (7.52)***
(1.31)
(0.05)
2
N= 31
R = 0.7939
Dh= 0.5768
ESt = 92060 + 0.78ESt-1 - 0.31CON + 0.19PRD - 0.39EXP - 137.95PW
(5.77)*** (5.66)*** (-6.23) *** (4.38)*** (-4.74)*** (-2.40)**
N= 31
R2 = 0.8442
Dh= 1.5746
Ln is the natural logarithm of a variable
Dh is the Durbin’s h statistic
*** Significantly different from 0 at 99% level of significance
** Significantly different from 0 at 95% level of significance
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% level of significance
Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, but it is not significant for Trinidad
and Tobago. As expected, the production coefficient is positive and significant in Barbados,
Belize, Ivory Coast, Congo, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, it is not significant for Madagascar. The
consumption coefficient is negative and significant in Barbados, Belize, Ivory Coast, Congo,
Guyana, Jamaica, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. It has the expected sign
(negative) but is not significant for Fiji, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Trinidad and Tobago. The
export coefficient is negative as expected and significantly different from zero for Barbados,
Belize, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad
and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. The price coefficient is negative and significant for Belize, Ivory
Coast, Congo, Guyana, Jamaica, Malawi, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. It is not
significant for Fiji, Madagascar, Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago.
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In this section, supply and demand responsiveness of the ACP countries to the sugar
protocol have been examined. The results shed some light on how the sugar protocol has
impacted these countries and three main conclusions can be drawn. First, the ACP sugar protocol
supply is price sensitive. Second, the sugar protocol created a cycle of dependency reducing the
incentives for the countries involved to improve their infrastructure and invest in the education of
farmers on better practices. Third, consumption of sugar seems to have become price and income
insensitive because consumers don’t have any choice. There is no substitute for sugar in these
countries and they end up paying even higher internal prices than their European counterparts
because of government policy implemented to protect producers.
4.2. Derivation of Transfer Benefits
In this section transfer benefits before and after the EU sugar policy reform are computed and the
effect of the reform are examined. As explained earlier, the basic profit function framework is
used where the transfer benefit is going to be derived as the difference between revenue and cost.
4.2.1. Pre Reform
Computed transfer benefits are interpreted as maximum welfare gains for participating countries
instead of actual estimates of the gains. We assume that each country fulfilled its quota
requirement meaning that they were able to export exactly the amounts that are allocated to
them. This assumption is made in order to capture the full effect of the protocol but also for
simplicity because data on the actual sugar protocol exports for all the countries were difficult to
obtain. Results on the calculated transfer benefits are summarized in Table 4.2.1. The table
reports on the protocol countries that are still supplying to the EU market. Therefore, out of the
19 countries that are members of the sugar protocol, computations were made on 14 because five
of 19 countries considered herein did not supply the EU sugar for that year. In fact, according to
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the ACP sugar web site data, Kenya, Suriname, Uganda, and Zambia have not supplied sugar to
the EU since 1986, 1980, 1978, and 1975, respectively. The other country, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
decided to stop its sugar production after learning about the proposal for the reform. We consider
2005 as a reference year because that is when the EU’s proposal was finalized and the reform
started in 2006. The first column displays the countries ranked from the highest cost producer to
the lowest cost producer, column two presents the computed total cost of production, column
three gives the EU price that was prevailing in 2005, column four is the 2005 break even which
is the difference between price and total cost, column five presents the quota allocations, column
six shows the transfer benefits which is the product of the break even and the quota, and the last
column displays the share of each country’s transfer benefit to the total benefit. At 2005’s EU
sugar price, the estimated income transfer of all beneficiary countries under the sugar protocol
amounts to 296.3 million U.S. Dollars for that year. As can be seen from the table, all countries
can profitably export at the pre-reform EU sugar price but the distribution is uneven. The highest
income transfers go to countries with the largest delivery rights while countries with smaller
quota rights receive a lower transfer. Accordingly, the largest share goes to Mauritius (42 per
cent) followed by Guyana (17 per cent), Fiji (14 per cent) and Swaziland (12 per cent). All
together, these four countries receive about 86 per cent of total transfer whereas the rest of the
ACP countries experience fairly small transfers. In fact Barbados, Congo, Ivory Coast,
Madagascar, Tanzania and Trinidad and Tobago each receive less than one per cent of the total
transfer.
The results also show that the most efficient countries are not the ones benefiting the
most from the sugar protocol, due to the fact that the quota quantities were assigned arbitrarily. It
can be summarized that all countries participating in the sugar protocol gain from the preferential
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agreement because export earnings are raised and a significant amount of hidden aid is realized
(Herrmann and Weiss).
Table 4.2.1 Results of the pre-reform sugar protocol impact
Country
Total costs EUP 05 Break even
Quota 05
($/Ton)
($/Ton)
05 ($/Ton)
(Ton)
673
680.13
7.13
43751
Trinidad
680.13
10.13
10760
Madagascar 670
633.69
680.13
46.44
118696
Jamaica
596
680.13
84.13
50312
Barbados
560
680.13
120.13
10186
Congo
531
680.13
149.13
10186
Tanzania
525
680.13
155.13
10186
Ivory Cost
497
680.13
183.13
40349
Belize
424
680.13
256.13
491031
Mauritius
423.05
680.13
257.08
165348
Fiji
370
680.13
310.13
117845
Swaziland
366.63
680.13
313.50
159410
Guyana
344.20
680.13
335.93
20824
Malawi
263.1
680.13
417.03
30225
Zimbabwe
Total

Transfer benefits
05 ($)
311,944.63
108,998.8
5,512,672.19
4,232,748.56
1,223,644.18
1,519,038.18
1,580,154.18
7,389,112.37
125,767,770
42,507,087.51
36,547,269.85
49,975,596.86
6,995,328.48
12,604,731.75
296,276,097.6

Share
0%
0%
2%
1%
0%
1%
1%
2%
42%
14%
12%
17%
2%
4%
100%

4.2.2. After Reform
The impact of the EU sugar policy reform are reported in table 4.2.2. The table reports the
information in the same manner as in table 4.2.1 except for the last column that was omitted. In
addition the price considered here is the 2005 EU price reduced by thirty per cent to capture the
full effect of the reform. Furthermore, we assume that costs structures stay the same for all
countries. The estimates of the post reform transfers are reported in table 4.2.2.
The results presented above show a considerable loss in export revenues for all countries. Under
the sugar policy reform scenario, production costs in many countries (Trinidad and Tobago,
Madagascar, Jamaica, Barbados, Congo, Tanzania, Ivory Coast and Belize) are too high and the
new EU price cannot make exports to the European Union profitable. The Caribbean countries
which were found to be medium to high costs producers are the most affected.
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Table 4.2.2 Results of the post-reform sugar protocol impact
Country

Total costs
($/Ton)
673
Trinidad
Madagascar 670
633.69
Jamaica
596
Barbados
560
Congo
531
Tanzania
525
Ivory Cost
497
Belize
424
Mauritius
423.05
Fiji
370
Swaziland
366.63
Guyana
344.20
Malawi
263.1
Zimbabwe

EUP 09
($/Ton)
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32
435.32

Break even 09
($/Ton)
-237.68
-234.68
-198.37
-160.68
-124.68
-95.68
-89.68
-61.68
11.32
12.27
65.32
68.69
91.12
172.22

Quota 05
(Ton)
43751
10760
118696
50312
10186
10186
10186
40349
491031
165348
117845
159410
20824
30225

Transfer benefits 09
($)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5,558,470.92
2,028,243.63
7,697,635.4
10,950,434.76
1,897,405.04
5,205,349.5

However, there are some countries (Mauritius, Fiji, Swaziland, Guyana, Malawi and
Zimbabwe) that are still efficient and can expand their production and export to the European
Union. These countries can take over the quotas allocated to countries which cannot fill their
quotas rights at the post reform price. If that is the case, the countries that cannot make profit will
find themselves losing everything because they would have to stop producing. In light of the
possible losses that are going to be experienced we develop a quota trade model with bilateral
monopoly behavior as a method to compensate the ACP sugar protocol countries as a whole. Our
aim is to allow the inefficient countries to have some revenue that they can use to invest in other
sectors where comparative advantage can be found.
4.3. Empirical Quota Market Analysis
This analysis is an adaptation of a bilateral monopoly model developed by Devadoss that makes
a reasonable representation of the sugar protocol. The model developed allows for a possible
solution to the EU sugar policy reform. Moreover, it provides a way for the quota to be
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redistributed to the most efficient sugar producing countries. The model of trade of quota rights,
described in the previous chapter, is applied here using the results presented in the previous
section. We investigate the economic return of the model using different scenarios. Our emphasis
is on deriving profits using the relative bargaining weighs, with the pricing and quantity decision
rule being of second order importance. In what follows, we assume that quantity decisions are
made by an outside party the European Union and for the sake of simplicity that the quota rights
are equally divided among the potential buyers.
4.3.1. Equal Bargaining Power Scenario
We begin with the computation of the profit distribution by assuming that all the parties involved
have equal bargaining power. When the buyer and seller have equal bargaining power, this
implies that 1-  is equal to  so that each party’s profit would be equal to the total profit divided
by two. The total profit is first derived and then equally divided among the countries. Equation
3.1.18 is used to derive the profit in each bilateral trade case and the results are reported in table
4.3.2.1 below. In Table 4.3.2.2, the first column displays the respective country. The second
column presents the calculated profits from the bilateral trade model. The third column is the
transfer benefits after the reform. The fourth column is the total which is the sum of the bilateral
trade profit and the transfer benefit after the reform.
The fifth column reports the transfer benefits before the reform and the sixth column
shows the gains or losses which is the difference between the total transfer and the transfer that
prevailed in 2005. The profit results show that there is a wide variation among potential sellers
and potential buyers. Zimbabwe (which is a potential buyer) is the country that makes the most
out of the model followed by Jamaica which is a potential seller. The comparison with the 2005
transfer shows that even though most of the countries still experience losses as a result of the
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sugar policy reform, there are income gains across all countries. One interesting result is that
potential sellers are able to receive a compensation that otherwise would not be available.
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that Madagascar and Trinidad and Tobago experience a
gain as a result of the bilateral trade with equal bargaining power.
Table 4.3.2.2 Results of the equal bargaining power model
Country

Profit ($)

Zimbabwe
Jamaica
Malawi
Barbados
Guyana
Swaziland
Trinidad
Belize
Madagascar
Congo
Ivory Cost
Tanzania
Fiji
Mauritius

4,225,504
4,163,621
2,235,583
1,764,846
1,685,430
1,602,659
1,534,699
1,415,363
377,439.6
357,304.8
357,304.8
357,304.8
300,965.1
277,741.9

Transfer
benefits 09 ($)
5,205,349.5
0
1,897,405.04
0
10,950,434.76
7,697,635.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,028,243.63
5,558,470.92

Total ($)
9,430,853
4,163,621
4,132,988
1,764,846
12,635,865
9,300,294
1,534,699
1,415,363
377,439.6
357,304.8
357,304.8
357,304.8
2,329,209
5,836,213

Transfer
benefits 05 ($)
12,604,731.75
5,512,672.19
6,995,328.48
4,232,748.56
49,975,596.86
36,547,269.85
311,944.63
7,389,112.37
108,998.8
1,223,644.18
1,580,154.18
1,519,038.18
42,507,087.51
125,767,770

Gain or loss
($)
-3,173,878.4
-1,349,050.9
-2,862,340.4
-2,467,903
-37,339,732
-27,246,976
1,222,754.05
-5,973,749.1
2,684,40.75
-866,339.42
-1222849.4
-1,161,733.4
-40,177,879
-119,931,557

4.3.2. Unequal Bargaining Power Scenario
We apply the unequal bargaining framework described in chapter three to create and analyze a
market for ACP sugar protocol countries quota. We consider an unequal bargaining framework
because we assume that in each bilateral trade case one party is going to have a superior
bargaining power over the other. We also assume quantity and price being determined
independently. We begin by using equation 3.2.11 to determine the bargaining power and then
3.2.12 and 3.2.13 are used to identify the profits in each case. Recalled 3.2.11
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β

rf (q*) − c 2 (q*)
c (q*)
+ (1 − β ) 1
= p*. From this equation we can derive β such that:
q*
q*

(4.3.3.1)
In our analysis,

= q*,

= c1.q*,

= c2.q* with c1, c2 representing the unit cost

for the seller and the buyer respectively.
The world price plays a major role in the bargaining process that is being analyzed. We
use world price as the determining factor in deriving the bargaining powers. The intuition behind
using the world price is that if the world price is high enough, there would be an incentive in the
part of the potential buyer not to participate in the quota trade and just produce and sell to the
world market. However in the case where the world price would be low it would be profitable for
the potential buyers to participate in the quota trade. Most market analysts expect world market
price to rise if the European Union cuts back production and export subsidies, as total supply will
decrease. Since the European Union is currently a major producer and exporter, the European
Union reform is expected to have an impact on world market, though the precise effect would be
difficult to quantify. Estimates of the impact of sugar policy reforms on world sugar prices vary
within a range of one to sixty per cent (Milner, Morgan, Zgovu). It should be noted that Brazil,
the world’s largest and most competitive producer of sugar, has been able to increase production
levels (and exports) dramatically in recent years. In the period from 1995/96 to 2004/05,
Brazilian exports almost quadrupled from 5.5 to 19.2 million tons. If Brazilian export supply
continues to grow at a rapid pace, Brazil could expand into other markets as the European Union
withdraws from exports markets. Thus, any price increase resulting from lower EU exports
might be insignificant or non-existent (Busse and Jerosch). Therefore, two scenarios will be
examined. The first is to examine the effect of a price (p*) set at the actual world price and the
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second is varying the world price by taking into account the effect that the EU sugar policy
reform might have on the world price for sensitivity purposes. An intermediate increase in value
of 30% of the world sugar price will be considered for the sensitivity analysis. Using the above
information combined with the cost and quota allocations provided in chapter II,

and (1-

were first derived and used to compute the profits for each party.
4.3.2.1. Unequal Bargaining Power with no World Price Effect
The results are shown in tables 4.3.3.1 through 4.3.3.14.
In this section we derive the bargaining power and profits under the condition that the EU sugar
policy reform does not affect the world sugar price. Tables 4.3.3.1 through 4.3.3.8 present the
sellers’ results. The tables report the seller’s bargaining power, total profit and the seller’s profit
in each bilateral trade case. For example, the bargaining power of Barbados, when it is selling to
Fiji, is 0.53, the total profit is 88164.70 U.S. dollars and Barbados’ share of total profit is
47092.99 U.S. dollars. All sellers, with a few exceptions, (Belize, Ivory Coast, Tanzania),
exercise superior bargaining power compared to that of buyers. This implies that sellers make
more profit than buyers (Tables 4.3.3.9-4.3.3.14) in the case of unequal bargaining powers with
no world market price effect. The overall impact of the scenario indicates that by implementing a
quota trade market, it is possible to increase the income transfers of those countries that were still
able to fill their quota allocation. Moreover, and perhaps a key result, those countries that are
obliged to cease production because it is no longer profitable under the new pricing scheme to
sell sugar to the European Union will receive income revenues that they can use to diversify their
economies toward more profitable activities.
4.3.2.2. Unequal Bargaining Power with World Price Effect
For sensitivity purposes we carry out the same exercise under the scenario of a 30% increase in
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world sugar price. These results are reported in Tables 4.3.3.15 through 4.3.3.29 below.
The results suggest that the price increase gives superior bargaining power to buyers. For the
most part, buyers have a substantial (almost double) increase in their bargaining power. The
large changes in bargaining power may be explained by the fact that as the world price goes up,
buyers have an alternative market opening to them. They can choose to expand their production
of sugar and sell to the world market instead of buying quota rights from the sellers. Because
sellers are also aware of this, they become less rigid during the bargaining process and lose some
of their power.
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Table 4.3.3.1 Barbados-Unequal no WP effect
Barbados
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.534
0.591
0.618
0.533
0.588
0.736

Total profit ($)
102,858.81
576,018.10
764,040.23
94,921.97
547,729.97
1,444,122.11

Partial profit1($)
54,941.82
340,603.52
471,846.74
50,620.29
321,817.68
1,062,526.01
2,457,180.65

Table 4.3.3.3 Congo - Unequal no WP effect
Congo
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.504
0.561
0.588
0.503
0.558
0.711

Total profit ($)
20,824.45
116,618.71
154,685.04
19,217.59
110,891.59
292,372.15

Partial profit1($)
10,485.73
65,465.12
90,986.59
9,659.93
61,825.62
207,943.27
446,366.27

Table 4.3.3.2 Belize - Unequal no WP effect
Belize
Buyers
β
Total profit ($) Partial profit1($)
Fiji
0.439
82,490.27
36,213.57
Guyana
0.497
461,952.50
229,516.71
Malawi
0.524
612,741.68
321,253.15
Mauritius 0.438
76,125.11
33,354.11
Swaziland 0.493
439,266.11
216,539.63
Zimbabwe 0.655
1,158,150.80
758,835.18
Total
1,595,712.35

Table 4.3.3.4 Ivory Coast - Unequal no WP effect
Ivory Coast
β
Total profit ($) Partial profit1($)
Buyers
0.470
20,824.45
9,779.99
Fiji
0.528
116,618.71
61,541.50
Guyana
0.555
154,685.04
85,848.25
Malawi
0.469
19,217.59
9,008.71
Mauritius
0.524
110,891.59
58,089.75
Swaziland
292,372.15
199,566.91
Zimbabwe 0.683
423,835.10
Total
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Table 4.3.3.5 Jamaica - Unequal no WP effect
Jamaica
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.563
0.619
0.645
0.562
0.615
0.758

Total profit ($)
242,664.37
1,358,941.10
1,802,522.64
223,939.79
1,292,203.79
3,406,970.85

Table 4.3.3.6 Madagascar - Unequal no WP effect
Madagascar
β
Buyers
0.587
Fiji
0.642
Guyana
0.666
Malawi
Mauritius 0.586
Swaziland 0.638
Zimbabwe 0.775
Total

Partial profit1 ($)
136,556.31
841,151.36
1,161,857.79
125,827.52
795,092.08
2,582,308.05
5,642,793.11

Total profit ($)
21,997.95
123,190.39
163,401.83
20,300.53
117,140.53
308,847.87

Partial profit1 ($)
12,903.11
79,039.31
108,899.98
11,890.37
74,738.40
239,369.82
526,840.99

Table 4.3.3.7 Tanzania - Unequal no WP effect

Table 4.3.3.8 Trinidad - Unequal no WP effect

Tanzania
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

Trinidad
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.476
0.534
0.561
0.475
0.530
0.688

Total profit ($)
20,824.45
116,618.71
154,685.04
19,217.59
110,891.59
292,372.15

Partial profit1 ($)
9,907.74
62,256.31
86,787.18
9,126.58
58,770.06
201,118.92
427,966.79
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β
0.588
0.643
0.668
0.588
0.640
0.776

Total profit ($)
89,445.38
500,901.73
664,404.60
82,543.55
476,302.55
1,255,799.54

Partial profit1 ($)
52,632.97
322,271.23
443,938.35
48,502.20
304,743.34
974,988.74
2,147,076.83

Table 4.3.3.9 Fiji - Unequal no WP effect
Fiji
1-β
Total profit ($)
Sellers
0.465852 102,858.8
Barbados
0.560996 82,490.27
Belize
0.49647
20,824.45
Congo
0.53036
20,824.45
Ivory Cost
0.437263 242,664.4
Jamaica
21,997.95
Madagascar 0.41344
0.524226 20,824.45
Tanzania
0.411563 89,445.38
Trinidad
Total

Table 4.3.3.10 Guyana - Unequal no WP effect
Guyana
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

Partial profit2 ($)
47,917.00
46,276.70
10,338.73
11,044.46
106,108.06
9,094.84
10,916.72
36,812.41
278,508.91

Table 4.3.3.11 Malawi - Unequal no WP effect
Malawi
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

1-β
0.382432
0.475712
0.411794
0.445013
0.355427
0.333545
0.438943
0.331825

Total profit ($)
764,040.2
612,741.7
154,685
154,685
1,802,523
163,401.8
154,685
664,404.6

1-β
0.408693
0.50316
0.43864
0.472284
0.381024
0.358397
0.466155
0.356618

Total profit ($)
576,018.1
461,952.5
116,618.7
116,618.7
1,358,941
123,190.4
116,618.7
500,901.7

Partial profit2 ($)
235,414.58
232,435.79
51,153.58
55,077.21
517,789.74
44,151.07
54,362.39
178,630.50
1,369,014.87

Table 4.3.3.12 Mauritius - Unequal no WP effect
Mauritius
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

Partial profit2 ($)
292,193.49
291,488.53
63,698.45
68,836.80
640,664.85
54,501.85
67,897.86
220,466.25
1,699,748.08
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1-β
0.466717
0.561851
0.497339
0.531226
0.438119
0.414283
0.525092
0.412405

Total profit ($)
94,921.97
76,125.11
19,217.59
19,217.59
223,939.8
20,300.53
19,217.59
82,543.55

Partial profit2 ($)
44,301.68
42,771.00
9,557.66
10,208.88
98,112.27
8,410.17
10,091.01
34,041.36
257,494.02

Table 4.3.3.13 Swaziland - Unequal no WP effect
Swaziland
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

1-β
0.412452
0.507042
0.442468
0.476157
0.384701
0.361977
0.470022
0.36019

Total profit ($)
547,730
439,266.1
110,891.6
110,891.6
1,292,204
117,140.5
110,891.6
476,302.6

Table 4.3.3.14 Zimbabwe - Unequal no WP effect
Zimbabwe
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

Partial profit2 ($)
225,912.29
222,726.48
49,065.96
52,801.84
497,111.71
42,402.13
52,121.52
171,559.21
1,313,701.15
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1-β
0.264241
0.344787
0.288772
0.317422
0.242052
0.224959
0.312113
0.223611

Total profit ($)
1,444,122
1,158,151
292,372.2
292,372.2
3,406,971
308,847.9
292,372.2
1,255,800

Partial profit2 ($)
381,596.10
399,315.62
84,428.89
92,805.24
824,662.80
69,478.05
91,253.23
280,810.80
2,224,350.72

Table 4.3.3.15 Barbados - Unequal with WP effect
Barbados
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.388
0.430
0.449
0.387
0.427
0.535

Total profit ($)
102,858.81
576,018.10
764,040.23
94,921.97
547,729.97
1,444,122.11

Partial profit1 ($)
39,918.28
247,467.36
342,822.83
36,778.45
233,818.40
771,984.10
1,672,789.42

Table 4.3.3.17 Congo - Unequal with WP effect
Congo
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.348
0.388
0.406
0.347
0.385
0.491

Total profit ($)
20,824.45
116,618.71
154,685.04
19,217.59
110,891.59
292,372.15

Partial profit1 ($)
7,244.20
45,227.43
62,859.27
6,673.69
42,713.03
143,660.30
308,377.91

Table 4.3.3.16 Belize - Unequal with WP effect
Belize
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.263
0.298
0.314
0.263
0.295
0.393

Total profit ($)
82,490.27
461,952.50
612,741.68
76,125.11
439,266.11
1,158,150.80

Partial profit1 ($)
21,704.32
137,559.03
192,540.54
19,990.52
129,781.32
454,801.87
956,377.60

Table 4.3.3.18 Ivory Coast - Unequal with WP effect
Ivory
Coast
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total
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β
0.303
0.341
0.358
0.303
0.338
0.441

Total profit ($)
20,824.45
116,618.71
154,685.04
19,217.59
110,891.59
292,372.15

Partial profit1 ($)
6,317.19
39,751.51
55,451.98
5,819.00
37,521.92
128,906.30
273,767.91

Table 4.3.3.19 Jamaica - Unequal with WP effect
Jamaica
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.425
0.468
0.487
0.425
0.465
0.573

Total profit ($)
242,664.37
1,358,941.10
1,802,522.64
223,939.79
1,292,203.79
3,406,970.85

Partial profit1 ($)
103,242.65
635,947.87
878,416.22
95,131.21
601,125.01
1,952,339.86
4,266,202.82

Table 4.3.3.21 Tanzania - Unequal with WP effect
Tanzania
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.311
0.349
0.367
0.311
0.347
0.450

Total profit ($)
20,824.45
116,618.71
154,685.04
19,217.59
110,891.59
292,372.15

Partial profit1 ($)
6,484.99
40,749.13
56,805.51
5,973.69
38,467.25
131,640.00
280,120.57

Table 4.3.3.20 Madagascar - Unequal with WP effect
Madagascar
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total

β
0.457
0.500
0.519
0.456
0.497
0.604

Total profit ($)
21,997.95
123,190.39
163,401.83
20,300.53
117,140.53
308,847.87

Partial profit1 ($)
10,051.58
61,571.99
84,833.59
9,262.65
58,221.56
186,470.20
410,411.59

Table 4.3.3.22 Trinidad - Unequal with WP effect
Trinidad
Buyers
Fiji
Guyana
Malawi
Mauritius
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Total
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β
0.459
0.502
0.522
0.459
0.500
0.606

Total profit ($)
89,445.38
500,901.73
664,404.60
82,543.55
476,302.55
1,255,799.54

Partial profit1 ($)
41,091.08
251,600.34
346,587.06
37,866.14
237,916.14
761,183.34
1,676,244.08

Table 4.3.3.23 Fiji - Unequal with WP effect

Table 4.3.3.24 Guyana - Unequal with WP effect

Fiji
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

Guyana
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

1-β
0.612
0.737
0.652
0.697
0.575
0.543
0.689
0.541

Total profit ($)
102,858.8
82,490.27
20,824.45
20,824.45
242,664.4
21,997.95
20,824.45
89,445.38

Partial profit2 ($)
62,940.53
60,785.95
13,580.25
14,507.26
139,421.72
11,946.36
14,339.46
48,354.30
365,875.85

Table 4.3.3.25 Malawi - Unequal with WP effect
Malawi
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

1-β
0.551
0.686
0.594
0.642
0.513
0.481
0.633
0.478

Total profit ($)
764,040.2
612,741.7
154,685
154,685
1,802,523
163,401.8
154,685
664,404.6

1-β
0.570
0.702
0.612
0.659
0.532
0.500
0.651
0.498

Total profit ($)
57,6018.1
461,952.5
116,618.7
116,618.7
1,358,941
123,190.4
116,618.7
500,901.7

Partial profit2 ($)
328,550.74
324,393.48
71,391.28
76,867.19
722,993.23
61,618.39
75,869.58
249,301.40
1,910,985.29

Table 4.3.3.26 Mauritius - Unequal with WP effect
Mauritius
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

Partial profit2 ($)
421,217.40
420,201.14
91,825.77
99,233.06
924,106.42
78,568.24
97,879.53
317,817.54
2,450,849.10
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1-β
0.613
0.737
0.653
0.697
0.575
0.544
0.653
0.541

Total profit ($)
94,921.97
76,125.11
19,217.59
19,217.59
223,939.8
20,300.53
19,217.59
82,543.55

Partial profit2 ($)
58,143.52
56,134.59
12,543.90
13,398.59
128,808.58
11,037.88
12,551.19
44,677.41
337,295.66

Table 4.3.3.27 Swaziland - Unequal with WP effect

Table 4.3.3.28 Zimbabwe - Unequal with WP effect

Swaziland
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

Zimbabwe
Sellers
Barbados
Belize
Congo
Ivory Cost
Jamaica
Madagascar
Tanzania
Trinidad
Total

1-β
0.573
0.705
0.615
0.662
0.535
0.503
0.653
0.500

Total profit ($)
547,730
439,266.1
110,891.6
110,891.6
1,292,204
117,140.5
110,891.6
476,302.6

Partial profit2 ($)
313,911.57
309,484.79
68,178.55
73,369.66
691,078.78
58,918.97
72,424.34
171,559.21
1,758,925.88
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1-β
0.465
0.607
0.509
0.559
0.427
0.396
0.550
0.394

Total profit ($)
1,444,122
1,158,151
292,372.2
292,372.2
3,406,971
308,847.9
292,372.2
1,255,800

Partial profit2 ($)
672,138.01
703,348.92
148,711.86
163,465.85
1,454,631.00
122,377.66
160,732.16
494,616.20
3,920,021.65

CHAPTER5. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
5.1. Summary and Conclusion
The pressures for reform within the World Trade Organization (WTO) have led to the
European Union reforming its sugar policy with a price cut phased from 2006 to end in
2009. The impact of this reform would be felt not only by EU sugar producers but also by
the ACP sugar protocol countries that have a preferential market access to the European
Union protected price embodied in the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements. The study
investigates the effect of the EU sugar policy reform on these ACP sugar countries.
This research makes two main contributions to the body of research literature.
First, by examining the supply and demand of the ACP sugar protocol countries,
innovations were made based upon the existing literature on the ACP-EU sugar market.
The behavior of ACP sugar protocol countries’ supply and demand functions during the
protocol years and prior to the reform were examined. While the determinants of supply
in some countries performed as expected, others did not show sign of an improvement
due to the sugar protocol. This suggests that there has been neglect or deterioration of the
infrastructure in the sugar industry. On the demand side it was found that, in some
countries, price does not affect the decision of the consumer due to the fact that there are
no ready substitutes for sugar in those countries.
Second, results of the quota market model under the simplifying assumptions of a
bilateral monopoly model are in part a test of whether there could be a solution to the
impact of the EU sugar policy reform on the ACP sugar protocol countries. This research
explored how the protocol countries are affected by the former regime and how they
would be affected when the full reform takes place. The results of the pre reform scenario
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show that the countries were enjoying substantial transfer benefits and that the size of the
transfer depends on the total cost, but mostly on the quota allocation. In the post-reform
scenario, results revealed that there are some countries that will no longer be able to make
profits if they were to continue producing and selling to the European Union.
Finally, the study develops a quota market analysis using a bilateral monopoly
methodology to examine negotiated transfer quota outcomes between ACP countries. We
allow for the countries that can no longer make profits to sell their quota rights to the
countries that can still make profit. Moreover different scenarios are examined,
alternatively assuming equal bargaining power and unequal bargaining power. In the
equal bargaining power case the total profit is equally divided between seller and buyer.
In the unequal bargaining power, we consider two cases. The case where the world price
is not affected by the EU sugar policy reform shows that sellers would have increased
bargaining power and a higher share of profit. A case where the world price is increased
by thirty per cent shows that the buyer will exercise superior bargaining power than the
seller and obtain the larger share of the profit. The results show that buyers and sellers
benefit from the quota market scenario and, most importantly, sellers that would have
ended up with a complete loss obtain revenue that can be invested in other activities to
enhance competitiveness.

5.2. Limitations of the Study
This research attempted to analyze the ACP sugar protocol countries supply and demand
and create a quota market model as a response to the EU sugar policy reform. The
research was challenged by data availability. On the supply and demand side the price
data was difficult to obtain and proxies had to be used in several cases, which may have
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affected the results in some cases. For example the data on producer price was not
available for each country. This led to the use of either the world or EU price, which was
then converted into producer price using each country’s respective exchange rate. In
addition, for the consumer price the closest proxy was the world price converted into
domestic price, once again using the respective exchange rates.
The second limitation was in the costs estimations. A complete data set on
transportation and production costs for the ACP countries could not be constructed.
Estimation was not possible because a time series data set of the variables that needed to
be used was not available. Because of confidentiality, we were not able to obtain the full
data from the recognized consulting company that has an up to date and reliable data.
Computed proxies were used as alternatives in the cases where data were not available.
Total cost was the sum of freight rates, fobbing costs and production costs. For
production costs, USDA attaché reports were used. For transportation costs, a data set
was provided by LMC International. Of the seventeen countries, data on freight rates and
fobbing costs were obtained for ten. LMC reports that all southern African countries ship
from either the ports of Maputo or Beira in Mozambique and therefore have the same or
similar freight rates. Following this rationale, freight rates are derived for the remaining
seven countries based on the assumption that countries from the same region are shipping
from the same port, and hence, all have the same rates. The fobbing rates for the
remaining seven countries were derived using the available fobbing costs in association
with the factors that explain differences in transport costs such as distance, country’s
geographical and infrastructure measures, and common borders.
Lastly because of the nature of the sugar protocol (form of aid to the ACP

78

countries), the application of the quota market model using the bilateral monopoly
methodology called for the relaxation of some assumptions. It was challenging to justify
the model theoretically and empirically but the use of the methodology was worth
performing in this case. In the theoretical model, the buyer and seller decide the optimal
price and quantity profile of the intermediate product by maximizing the product of each
party’s profit, weighted by their bargaining powers. Our goal diverges from the
framework in that we assume that quantity is predetermined by an external party. This is
due to the nature of the sugar protocol and considering the fact that in previous cases
where a country could not fulfill it quota requirement, the European Union was deciding
the reallocation of that quota. Also, considering the nature of the sugar protocol, the price
decision was clearly going to depend on the world price which led us to use the world
price to solve for bargaining powers and profits.
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